Dear Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Cohen, Members of the U.S. Helsinki Commission:

It is a privilege for me to appear before you today, albeit virtually. I had the distinct honor of being a member of this august Commission when I served as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights at the end of the George W. Bush administration. I’m grateful for this opportunity to be back with you. The Commission performs extremely important work, proudly upholding the commitments made under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and ensuring that we and other members of the OSCE live up to those commitments.

Today, we are here to discuss a country, Belarus, whose illegitimate regime, the Lukashenka regime, does not fulfill any of the Helsinki Accords commitments, especially when it comes to the human dimension. Your hearing today is an extremely important way to spotlight what is happening in Belarus and in the region. It comes two months after the pathbreaking visit to the United States by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the democratic forces in Belarus and the true winner of last August’s presidential election.

Tsikhanouskaya has shown tremendous courage and leadership under extremely adverse circumstances. We owe her and those standing with her a debt of gratitude for holding true to the values enshrined in the Helsinki Accords in the face of grave threats and challenges. I also wish to acknowledge my fellow panelists for the bravery they have shown and their commitment, and that of the organizations and movements they represent, to the cause of democracy and freedom. It is an honor to appear with them here today.

While last August’s stolen presidential election marked a turning point in Belarus and a wake-up call for much of the world, the situation in that country has been dreadful for many years. Ever since winning the presidential election in Belarus 27 years ago, Lukashenka has concentrated power into his own hands and has run the country into the ground, disappearing critics, attacking journalists, imprisoning opponents, torturing detainees, enfeebling his nation and selling out Belarus’ sovereignty and independence in exchange for Russian support. He urged Belarusians to take a sauna, drink vodka and ride a tractor to stave off infection from the COVID pandemic. His lunacy, repression and corruption reached such levels that by the time of last August’s election, despite Lukashenka’s efforts to rig it, the vast majority of voters decided they had had enough.

Tsikhanouskaya, whose husband was disqualified from participating in last August’s presidential election and then arrested, stepped in for her husband and won – yet was denied victory and then was forced out of the country. In unprecedented numbers, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians protested Lukashenka’s blatant stealing of the election, in which it was crystal clear that he lost – and by a wide margin.

In response to the protests, Lukashenka launched a massive and vicious crackdown against the people of Belarus. A number of people died at the hands of Lukashenka’s thugs, tens of thousands were arrested, many endured torture, hundreds remain political prisoners, and many more were driven out of the country. Journalists both domestic and foreign, including a number associated with RFE/RL and other Western outlets, have been special targets of Lukashenka. In a clear act of air piracy, if not outright terrorism, Lukashenka in May forced down a Ryanair flight traversing Belarusian territory to apprehend a Belarusian blogger and journalist, Roman Protasevich, who was on board. A military aircraft flew close to the civilian airliner to leave it no choice but to land in Minsk, endangering everyone on board. It is worth noting that a short time later Russian authorities, taking a page from the Lukashenka authoritarian playbook, forced a Lot Airliner to return to the terminal in St. Petersburg to arrest a Russian activist on board, Andrey Pivovarov. If any of us fly over an authoritarian regime and that regime suspects a critic or activist is on board, we might be subject to similarly dangerous stunts.

In another alarming incident, Lukashenka’s agents likely murdered Vital Shyshou, a Belarusian activist who was living in Ukraine and was found hanged from a tree in Kyiv. That act of transnational repression, an increasingly common act carried out by authoritarian regimes, was designed to warn those who have fled Belarus that they may not be safe even outside of the country. All this means that blood is dripping from Lukashenka’s hands, as he engages in the worst human rights abuses in Europe and ranks among the worst in the entire world. That this is occurring in the heart of Europe and on the territory of the OSCE makes this our concern.

Making matters worse, Lukashenka this summer began flying thousands of migrants from the Middle East to Minsk and then forced them across the border into neighboring Lithuania in particular but also Poland to overwhelm their immigration systems in retaliation for those countries’ support for Belarusian democratic forces. This inhumane weaponization of migrants has posed serious security and humanitarian challenges for these countries, already strained by the influx of fleeing Belarusians and Russians, and has forced them to take drastic measures to protect their borders. Their fellow EU member states and the United States need to do more to to support these frontline states and push back on this latest outrage from Lukashenka.

Putin’s Support for Lukashenka Makes All the Difference

Without support from Russian President Vladimir Putin and his circle, Lukashenka undoubtedly would no longer be in power. Putin has provided military, security, political, financial and propaganda backing to prop up his like-minded counterpart in Minsk. Utterly dependent on Putin for staying in power, Lukashenka has left Belarus more vulnerable to Putin’s whims and virtual takeover while isolating his regime from the respected part of the international community. By prolonging Lukashenka in power, Putin, too, has the blood of Belarusians on his hands. It is widely known that Putin and Lukashenka despise each other, though for the time being they seem to have put aside their differences given that they have met in person more than half a dozen times since last August’s election. If Putin had an alternative to Lukashenka, the Russian leader likely would have found some way to install a new person in Minsk. At the same time, Putin does not want to see regime change in Belarus at a time when there is growing popular pressure for such change.

Putin’s fear of seeing like-minded authoritarian leaders driven from power as a result of popular movements and opposition dates back to the “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 as well as the Arab Spring movements in 2011 that brought down a number of tyrants in the Middle East. Seared into his memory is what happened to Qaddafi in Libya in 2011 and Yanukovych in Ukraine in 2014. In response to the latter, Putin illegally annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas region of Ukraine. He refuses to accept that people in other countries, to say nothing of Russians themselves, are capable, on their own, of demanding democratic change and an end to corrupt rule. They must be instigated from the outside, in particular from the United States.

If not stopped, Putin worries these movements spurred on by the West could spread to Russia itself. This insecurity on Putin’s part, combined with a degree of brazenness at the same time, has produced the worst human rights crackdown inside Russia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Things got noticeably worse in the lead-up to this past weekend’s Duma elections – which the OSCE declined to observe due to limitations Russian authorities sought to impose on the mission – reflecting the Kremlin’s recognition that it cannot afford to leave things to chance given the low ratings of the party in power, United Russia. Thus, any real opposition forces and individuals were disqualified from running, and Russian authorities pressured American technology companies to remove apps from their systems that were designed to direct voters to candidates other than United Russia members, a system called “smart voting.” Last Friday, Apple and Google caved to such pressure and removed the smart voting app. Just like he remembers the color revolutions and the Arab Spring, Putin will never forget the protests in Russia itself after fraudulent Duma elections in 2011 that continued into 2012, until an ugly crackdown against the demonstrators. There, too, he accused the U.S. and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for giving the “signal” for people to turn out in the streets, since he finds it incomprehensible that Russians themselves, fed up with his rule and unhappy with his return to the presidency, would protest on their own against him.

This explains, in part, Putin’s support for Lukashenka. Belarusians on their own, Putin undoubtedly believes, are incapable of turning out into the streets. Once again, according to his conspiratorial mind, they must be instigated by the West – and must be stopped. Unlike the protests in Ukraine in 2013-14 in which Yanukovych’s u-turn on signing agreements with the European Union triggered the demonstrations in the Maidan, the protests in Belarus were neither pro-Western nor anti-Russian. They were anti-Lukashenka and pro-Belarus. By supporting the unpopular, illegitimate and brutal dictator in Minsk, Putin risks turning the people of Belarus against him and Russia, much like his invasion of Ukraine in 2014 drove up support among Ukrainians for joining NATO.

At the same time, Putin does not want the responsibility and economic burden of incorporating Belarus into Russia and seems hesitant to formalize the union state the two governments signed back in 1999 between Lukashenka and Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. After amending the Russian constitution last year through a rigged plebiscite to extend his ability to stay in office potentially until 2036, Putin no longer needs a Russia-Belarus Union State as an option for staying in power.

During the recent and fifth in-person meeting this year between Putin and Lukashenka, Putin reaffirmed his support for his neighbor, but the two leaders did not finalize the union state treaty, as some had anticipated. In addition to Putin’s reservations about finalizing the deal, Lukashenka appears to have concluded that he would rather be leader, even illegitimate, of an independent Belarus than a vassal under Putin. And yet to stay in power, he has increased his dependence on Putin and Russia and vitiated Belarus’ sovereignty and independence in the process. Lukashenka is only interested in staying in power; in doing so, he has done stunning damage to Belarus as a country and its people.

While Putin may not be interested in full absorption of Belarus, he is exploiting Lukashenka’s vulnerability and dependence on the Kremlin to expand Russia’s military footprint in the country. This includes the stationing of Russian military aircraft and other weapons systems in Belarus and a record number of military exercises this year between the two countries’ militaries. As analyst Brian Whitmore has noted, “the constant rotation of Russian forces amount[s] to a de facto permanent Russian troop presence in Belarus.”

The Zapad military exercise that concluded last week on the territory of Belarus and Russia generated great concern in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Poland. Belarus provides Russia with a more westward military position – and a more proximate threat to Belarus’ neighbors. According to the Russian defense ministry, some 200,000 personnel participated in the exercise, even if only 12,800 troops, an apparent violation of the Vienna Document of the OSCE, a protocol designed to ensure transparency regarding military exercises.

Why Should We Care? What Can and Should We Do?

For starters, Lukashenka’s blatant abuse of human rights is happening in the heart of Europe, in a country of nearly 10 million people that has threatening spillover effects into other nations, most notably Lithuania, but also Poland, Ukraine and Latvia. Three of those four countries are fellow NATO member states with Article 5 security guarantees. Lukashenka’s weaponization of migrants is a form of hybrid warfare that poses serious risks to those neighboring states – and is a gross violation of those migrants’ human rights. His decision to force the Ryanair flight to land in May endangered everyone on that plane and, if repeated, could result in even more disastrous consequences in the future. The murders of Belarusian activists in other countries underscore the threat Lukashenka and his security forces pose to life, liberty and rule of law – quite simply, to our way of life.

To ignore what is happening would not only betray our values and norms but the people of Belarus struggling for a better future who look to us for support. They are not asking us to fight their battle for them but to stand up for freedom and democracy and against authoritarianism. They also want the West to end its enabling of the Lukashenka regime, which we have been guilty of before by misguidedly lifting sanctions and seeking normalization with that regime. No U.S. secretary of state or national security adviser should have met with Lukashenka, as Mike Pompeo did last February and John Bolton did the year before. Such meetings legitimized a brutal dictator who should be shunned, not courted.

Supporting the democratic forces in Belarus is consistent with the emphasis President Biden has placed on human rights and freedom as part of his foreign (and domestic) policy agenda. In the struggle of democracy versus authoritarianism, Belarus stands out as a test case for the West.

The situation in Belarus also represents a major challenge to the OSCE and the concomitant human dimension commitments under the Helsinki Accords. As this Commission knows full well, the 1991 Moscow Concluding Document states: “The participating States emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of international order. They categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.” In other words, what is happening in Belarus is our business and that of other OSCE member states. Moreover, the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace cannot be realized as long as Belarus remains under dictatorial rule, supported by the like-minded Putin regime.

For the most part, the Western response to the situation in Belarus has revolved around the imposition of several rounds of sanctions on Lukashenka and his regime, most recently on August 9, the one-year anniversary of the stolen election. The targets of these measures include a number of individuals and Lukashenka himself as well as enterprises in the potash and energy sectors. There is no doubt these have made life more difficult for the regime, and yes, for the people of Belarus, too. If they have made Lukashenka more dependent on Russia, that is the fault of Lukashenka, not the West. These measures need to be ramped up on a regular basis, but they need to go farther. The West should cut off all trading in Belarus debt, including on the secondary market. It should have blocked the IMF from granting nearly $1 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) provided for many countries due to the pandemic. This was a lifeline that will only benefit Lukashenka, not the Belarusian population.

As I argued in testimony in May before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, the West should go after the so-called wallets or moneybags, individuals connected to Lukashenka who prop him up financially. These include Russian figures who have been instrumental in Lukashenka’s staying power, as well as Belarusians. Cut off the flows from them and you reduce Lukashenka’s days in power.

The EU and UK, but not the United States, have sanctioned Mikhail Gutseriyev, a Russian-British oligarch who is very close to Lukashenko. Gutseriyev helped Lukashenka replace TV presenters who quit in protest over the crackdown and replaced them with RT fill-ins. His son bought the fifth largest bank in Belarus, and his oil company Safmar was the only supplier that continued to ship oil to Belarus after Putin cut shipments in January 2020. The United States should target him along with German Gref and Sberbank, which has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into Belarusian real estate and has its own Belarusian subsidiary. Gref has expressed his full support for Lukashenka during numerous visits to Minsk. Other Russian banks and companies that prop up Lukashenka – like VTB, VEB, Gazprombank, Gazprom, Slavneft, Rosneft and Uralkali – should be sanctioned, too.

When Belarusian presenters resigned last summer over the crackdown, Russian propagandists – including employees of RT – were brought to Minsk to fill the airwaves with pro-Lukashenka nonsense. They are not journalists – they are dangerous propagandists and should be targeted for sanctions. For that matter, RT as a whole should be sanctioned; it is a nefarious propaganda arm of the Kremlin pretending to be a journalistic outlet.

We need to inform our allies in the Middle East, who have provided funding and support for Lukashenka, that they can do business with us or with the Belarusian dictator, but not both. It is time for them to make a choice. We also need to ensure that no American citizens or companies are doing business with Lukashenka and thus helping to prop him up. In addition, we must do everything we can to stop Lukashenka’s weaponization of migrants and support those countries on the receiving end as well as the innocent victims of such inhumane measures. Standing with Lithuania against Chinese pressure in a dispute involving Taiwan, which Secretary of State Blinken has done, is important but no less important is pushing back on Lithuania’s reckless dictator next door.

Sanctions are a tool, sometimes a very effective tool, but they must be part of a larger strategy and used systematically. Accordingly, we need a clear articulation of our goals and policy that should start with this: we will never recognize Lukashenka as the legitimate leader of Belarus. He may have come to power through fair elections in 1994, but he long ago forfeited any right to be considered a legitimate leader, well before trying to steal last August’s presidential election.

As long as Lukashenka remains in power, illegitimately, Belarus has no hope of a better, brighter future. With him gone, Belarus has no guarantee of a better, more democratic future, but for the first time it will have such a possibility. Thus, Lukashenka’s departure from power must be the overriding goal of the West. This would align us with the aspirations of the people of Belarus, too.

Achieving this objective should be done through maintaining isolation of the regime in Minsk and increasing sanctions as discussed above. New free and fair elections are possible only after Lukashenka has left the scene. Only his departure from power will create the space and possibility for Belarus to start a new chapter and regain the hope of beginning a transition away from dictatorship and toward democracy. We also must press for the release of all political prisoners and accountability for the gross human rights abuses perpetrated by Lukashenka and his thugs.

We must warn Putin that continued support, military or otherwise, for his Belarusian counterpart will incur costs for the Kremlin. As it is, we are witnessing the not-so-slow Russian takeover economically of Belarus, and that, too, needs to be stopped. We have wanted to avoid turning Belarus into an East-West clash, but we also need to be mindful that our caution on that score can get in the way of doing what’s right. So far, the democratic movement in Belarus has been neutral toward Russia, but miscalculations by Putin could turn sentiment against their neighbor to the east.

Finally, the West needs to prepare to support Belarus when it finally reaches the day when Lukashenka is gone from the scene. It will need lots of help, and the people of Belarus have demonstrated that they deserve it. The EU has pledged some $3.7 billion in support to help the country move onto a democratic path, and the United States should also get ready for a serious assistance package when better days come for Belarus.

One way or another, Lukashenka’s days are numbered. He may think he has regained the upper hand, but he has lost all legitimacy and relies on massive repression and Putin’s support to stay in power. He has hung on longer than some, including this author, thought but that is due to Putin’s backing. We must tighten the screws on him and his regime, as well as his Russian enablers, and stand with the brave people of Belarus. Amid grave risks, the people of Belarus seek an end to dictatorship and the dawn of a new, more democratic day in Belarus. They are upholding the finest tradition of the Helsinki Accords, and that should be a cause worthy of our support.

***

The security forces subordinated to Aliaksandr Lukašenka are ready to shoot at their peaceful and law-abiding compatriots. This was now stated directly by one of Interior Minister Karajeŭ’s deputies.

Belarus has been under authoritarian rule for more than a quarter of a century, and it seems that after all these years we could have gotten used to anything. But I still can’t contain my shock and outrage at this statement.

After all, the current Belarusian protest is especially characterised by incredible peacefulness and wisdom shown by the people of Belarus. The whole world admires this peacefulness, this wisdom and bright creativity of the Belarusians, which we see all this time. We, thousands of Belarusians and descendants of Belarusians scattered around the world, are proud of our origin now more than ever. Other nations, who unknowingly sometimes thought that Belarusians were happy with their sad fate, now look at Belarus in a new way; they worry about Belarusians and are proud of them.

And what arouses the respect and admiration of the whole world is what arouses the rage and hatred of those who know that their time has passed irrevocably. They can comfort themselves as much as they want with artificial figures from the official election results. They will hate, will lie and threaten from the TV, will beat and shoot.

The Belarusian people are one step away from freedom. A step away from what generations of our ancestors fought for, including the heroes of the Sluck Defence Action, the century of which we will celebrate in a little over a month.

All our prayers, all our thoughts these days are with Belarus. With Belarus are all our tears of indignation at the brutality of the executioners.

And so are our tears of joy when we see thousands and thousands of people every week on the streets of Belarus: old and young, women and men, residents of Minsk and residents of small towns.

The revolution takes place not in the administration, but in the souls and hearts of the people. This revolution has already taken place. This revolution takes place every day, every time Belarusians go out of their homes, smile at their neighbours, sing, march together under our national flag – joined in common joy, in a common sense of belonging to their land, in a common demand for justice and truth.

Belarus has come to life and will definitely win. Do not stop, do not be afraid, and know: the truth is behind you and the whole world is behind you, from Europe to Canada and Australia.

Long live Belarus!

Ivonka Survilla
President of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic

1. How did you manage to keep the uninterrupted tradition of statehood intact for so many years?

The tradition of the Belarusian Democratic Republic was preserved through years of effort and work of the Belarusian diaspora. Hundreds of concerned and politically active people, even in exile, remained faithful to Belarus and spent their energy, time and money on Belarusian activism. The constitutional regulations of the BNR Rada, adopted in 1917-1918, allowed for the co-optation of new members. This allowed the Rada to refresh its membership over the subsequent decades.

BNR Rada has traditionally relied on the organizations of the Belarusian diaspora in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and Australia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Belarusian communities in the Czech Republic and Poland also play a significant role. Separate members of the Rada also live in other countries.

The community of Belarusian political exiles has been constantly supported by new waves of political refugees: in the twenties, then after World War II, and then after A. Lukashenka came to power.

In exile, the BNR Rada has been performing several important functions.

Firstly, the Rada remained a guardian of the traditions and of the continuity of the Belarusian liberation movement at a time when the occupiers of Belarus brutally fought this movement, killing thousands and sending tens of thousands to concentration camps. As de jure the supreme governmental institution of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in exile, whose task is to guarantee the establishment of a democratic Constitution and permanent democratic state bodies of Belarus, the BNR Rada is an important legal, historical and moral factor. An army is not considered defeated if the enemy hasn’t captured it’s flag. Same with the BNR Rada remaining active in exile.

Secondly, the BNR Rada represents the interests of the Belarusian people in the free world, educates policymakers and the general public in the West, counters the propaganda about Belarus.

Finally, the BNR Rada is there to unite Belarusian political activists in different countries, from Canada to Australia.

2. How do you plan to establish the authority of the Belarusian Democratic Republic on the territory of the Republic of Belarus? Will you follow the scenario of the Ukrainian People’s Republic’s government in exile or a different path?

The BNR Rada does not necessarily aim at taking the place of the current authoritarian government of Belarus.

The BNR Rada was established in December 1917 at the All-Belarusian Congress of political and social organizations. The BNR Rada became a provisional supreme state body of Belarus, whose task was to hold a national Constituent Assembly, where a democratic Constitution would be adopted. According to this Constitution, democratic elections would be held, and permanent state bodies would be established – and later accept the authority from BNR Rada.

History, as we know, made its adjustments. But our ultimate goal remains the same as a hundred years ago – to transfer the BNR Rada’s historical mandate to a democratically elected government of Belarus, and thus to give this future government historical legitimacy. Thereby we would legally and symbolically link the Belarusian Democratic Republic of 1918 and the future democratic Belarus, finally witnessing the victory of the Belarusian national liberation movement and the achievement of the goals set for us by the All-Belarusian Congress in 1917.

3. Is there a shadow government and do you have an action plan in case you return to power?

De jure, the Presidium of the BNR Rada has the functions of a government. As stated above, the Rada does not necessarily need to return to power itself: we look forward to the formation of a democratic government in Belarus, and our mission is to contribute to this in every way, in cooperation with the democratic opposition inside Belarus.

The Rada has no ideology other than adherence to a number of basic values.

The first value is the independence of Belarus on the basis of the Belarusian culture and language, and of the continuity with previous historical forms of the Belarusian statehood, especially the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Duchy of Połack.

Our second unconditional fundamental value are the principles of democracy and respect for human rights.

4. With what other governments in exile do you have official contacts? Are there any acts of recognition or mutual recognition?

The BNR Rada has traditionally had contacts with representatives of the governments of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and other countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union we have no relations with other governments in exile: the relevant institutions of Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States have transferred their powers to democratic authorities of their countries.

Unlike in the Cold War, now our contacts are not fully-fledged interstate contacts: there is a certain legal conflict due to the fact that the Republic of Belarus is now officially recognized as a sovereign state and has diplomatic relations with the democratic nations. We are interested in Belarus having this status.

This does not prevent us from acting as de facto the oldest global Belarusian pro-independence and pro-democracy advocacy group, as the coordinating body of activists working with the governments of the countries in which they live.

However, if threats to the independence of the Republic of Belarus become realized, the BNR Rada will remain the sole legal governmental body that represents Belarus in the world. The existence of the BNR Rada as such a potential “insurance” is still justified because the current regime in Belarus is incapable of guaranteeing the state sovereignty.

5. Do you plan to issue coins or print stamps, even as souvenirs?

Previously, the Rada used to issue stamps, also while already in exile. Now we also receive such proposals but are not engaged in anything like that. It is not clear how this would help us achieve our goals. The BNR Rada is trying to engage in projects that would have a real impact, given our capabilities and status. We do not want to turn into a sham and a parody of ourselves, like some other exiled governments and royal houses have: this would be a clear sign of decline.

6. What state awards does the BNR Rada have? What moments of Belarusian history are commemorated with the awards of the BNR Rada? Can you tell us about who has been awarded by the government of the Belarusian Democratic Republic?

Four awards are currently recognized as official by the BNR Rada: the Order of the Pahonia, the Order of the Iron Knight, the Partisan Medal and the Belarusian Democratic Republic 100th Jubilee Medal.

The Order of the Pahonia is the highest state award. The Order of the Iron Knight is the highest military award. The Partisan Medal was presented to the participants of the partisan struggle for the independence of Belarus, and the medal to the Belarusian Democratic Republic 100th Jubilee Medal – to our outstanding contemporaries who have contributed to the popularization and development of the Belarusian culture, the struggle for democracy and independence of Belarus.

Among the recipients of the Belarusian Democratic Republic 100th Jubilee Medal there are several outstanding Belarusian statespeople who have restored the independence of Belarus in 1991 and whose achievements are not being recognized by the pro-Russian regime of A. Lukashenka. These include the leaders of the Belarusian Popular Front and the first head of state of the restored independent Belarus, Stanisłaŭ Šuškievič (Shushkevich). The Medal was also presented to outstanding cultural figures, including Nobel laureate Śviatłana Aleksijevič (Svetlana Alexievich), as well as to pro-democracy activists, political prisoners, activists of the Belarusian diaspora and foreigners who have been helping Belarus.

(Photo: BNR Rada President Ivonka Survilla with the President of Czech Republic, Václav Havel in 2004)

The media coverage of international sporting events is often colored by the fact that publications have spent a fortune buying TV rights to the events and sent journalists and photographers to cover them.

This year’s biggest Olympic sports event in Europe – the European Games in Minsk, which the state-owned Danish public service media company DR has purchased the broadcasting rights to – is no exception.

Last week’s Danish media coverage of the European games in Belarus, which is called “Europe’s last dictatorship”, has largely been influenced by the Danish reporters’ focus on the Danish athletes’ sporting ups and downs during the games.

On the other hand, criticism of the authoritarian host nation, which for 25 years has been ridden hard by president Alexander Lukashenka, a former Soviet military officer, has been absent in the media just as democracy is absent in Belarus, as Lukashenka’s critics believe.

In his welcome speech to the more than 4,000 athletes participating in the games in Minsk, including about 60 from Denmark, “Europe’s last dictator”, who for 13 years has been regarded as a national security threat in the United States, left with mentioning Belarus as “a beautiful, hospitable and cozy country”, “home to the most honest and friendly people”.

In comparison, international human rights and press freedom organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the Committee to Protect Journalists emphasize that Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule is severely hampering any political resistance and arresting journalists, lawyers and human rights defenders who are questioning his regime.

Therefore, Sportspressen.dk has asked one of the most persistent critics of Alexander Lukashenka’s government to comment on Belarus’s hosting of the European Games. The country’s more than 100-year-old democratic government, The Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, formed on March 25, 1918 in the middle of World War I and the Russian Revolution, was forced to emigrate in 1919 and has been functioning in exile ever since.

Political propaganda

The still existing government-in-exile continues to struggle for democratic reforms in Belarus. And it claims to be backed by thousands of Belarusians both inside Belarus and abroad, in countries such as Britain, the United States, Canada, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Estonia and Belgium, who are a critical opposition to Alexander Lukashenka’s regime.

“Belarus, as an independent country in Europe, is certainly entitled to host major sporting events. We welcome both the event as such and the opportunities for developing international contacts it provides. On the other hand we categorically can’t welcome that the incumbent regime of Lukashenka seeks to exploit it as a political event”, says an official representative of the Belarusian exile government who wants to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation from Lukashenka’s government.

“Ever since the 1936 Olympic Games, European dictatorships have seen sporting events as useful tools in political propaganda. Belarus is also today an authoritarian one-man regime. The human rights and political rights situation remains unacceptable. Trying to obscure it through an international sporting event, which aims to make the international community, especially in Europe, consider the situation in Belarus as normal, is not something to be accepted for a modern European country.”

Feel-good atmosphere

Three years ago, the European Games host was awarded to Minsk by the EOC, an association of half a hundred European Olympic Committees, which currently holds the Danish Sports Federation / Danish Olympic Committee Chairman, Niels Nygaard, as Vice President.

The EOC has constantly been criticized for placing the games in a country that does not respect international human rights. And Belarus’ exile government also does not believe that the European Games in Minsk do anything good for the democratic development in the country:

“Something that makes the existing government feel self-confident and internationally accepted, yet does not motivate it to undertake economic and democratic reforms, does not help re-establish democracy in Belarus,” said the exile government representative and elaborated on the criticism of Alexander Lukashenka’s regime:

“Under Lukashenka, over the years, the authorities in Belarus have spent a lot of money organizing sports events as a means of propaganda and self-promotion. A responsible democratic government would have prioritized other areas such as health, education, national culture and environment. For Lukashenka’s regime, the purpose of using public money on sporting events has been to control the country’s public life and shift its attention away from political affairs so that Lukashenka and his inner circle can maintain their power and economic control. It has created a feel-good atmosphere with the celebration of large mass festivities at the expense of material and social improvements to the people’s living conditions. This self-centered political strategy on international sporting events is not good for the development of democracy in Belarus.”

Fear of Russian annexation

Ever since the Belarusian democratic government was forced into exile a hundred years ago, it has had the reintroduction of democracy in the country as its overriding goal. Several presidents of the government have changed in exile, the present one is Ivonka Joanne Survilla, living in Canada. The exile government has, among other things, collaborated with and advised governments in democratic countries on political conditions in Belarus.

Currently, exile leaders are following the current political negotiations for increased cooperation between Belarus and Russia, which began six years ago by the presidents of the two countries, Alexander Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin.

In January this year, the negotiations led the exile government to issue a statement on its website warning of a possible Russian attempt to annex Belarus.

But even though Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev stood at Alexander Lukashenka’s side during the European Games opening ceremony at Dynamo Stadium in Minsk last Friday, and Vladimir Putin is expected to attend the weekend’s closing ceremony, the exile government spokesman believes the timing is random:

“The negotiations have more or less been going on for over 20 years. Strategically, Belarus’s authoritarian regime seeks to benefit from the economic and political support of the West and the EU without showing any signs of progression in relation to democracy and human rights of the people of Belarus”, he says, continuing:

“For this purpose, the European Games are intended as a PR event both internationally and nationally. Unfortunately, the Olympic establishment has been reputed to ignore the host countries’ difficulties in complying with international human rights and laws ever since the 1936 and 1980 Olympic Games. In some European sports assemblies, human rights and democratic rights still seem to be more of a “matter of opinion” than about inalienable rights. Unfortunately, despite their persistent and well-documented human rights violations, the arrangement of major sporting events in Russia or Belarus has not changed this line of thought”.

Political game around Kadyrov

When the European Games opened last week, the Russian republic of Chechnya’s disputed political leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, was just behind Dmitri Medvedev in the VIP lodge. And just before the opening ceremony, the Chechen who was accused, among other things, of being behind murder of political opponents and of being responsible for violent attacks on homosexuals in Chechnya, received a Belarusian friendship order by Alexander Lukashenka.

Both these facts are considered by Belarus’s democratic government-in-exile as an expression of Lukashenka’s more than two decades of experience of playing complicated games with Russian top politicians and security professionals.

“It may have something to do with trying to navigate between different clans in Putin’s regime. Lukashenka’s behavior in relation to Kadyrov may be due to the fact that he has abandoned any hope of developing peaceful relations with the top leaders of the Russian army and the FSB in Moscow, and that he is now trying to find a new shortcut to influence Putin”, the exiled government representative explains.

“By aligning with Kadyrov, Lukashenka may be trying to find support in Putin’s inner circle outside of Moscow’s Federal Security Service and the military leadership in Russia. But the fact that Lukashenka assigns a state Belarusian order to a man like Kadyrov for political and tactical reasons to secure political support in Russia, is deeply regrettable. Unfortunately, this practice has been widely used in Belarus under Lukashenka’s one-man rule for over 20 years”.

The European Games will end on Sunday. But Alexander Lukashenka’s rule over Belarus will continue. Next month, the president celebrates his first 25 years of power.

By Lars Jørgensen

27 June 2019

(Translated from Danish)

http://sportspressen.dk/?p=1564

If the sovereigns of my land had been as wise as the emperors of China, they probably would have built a wall along their border with the Duchy of Moscow at the very beginning of her aggressions against their territory. Instead, exhausted by the defensive wars against their Eastern neighbours, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the medieval predecessor of today’s Belarus), formed a defensive alliance with Poland. This happened in Lublin in 1569. 440 years later, I am speaking to you of the Government of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, which has been in Exile for the past 90 years. Once more – because of the expansionist policies of our Eastern “big brother”.

This presentation explores conditions that have affected Belarus’ existence since the early 20th century. Bolshevik aggression forced a legitimate Government into exile and required its existence beyond the borders of Belarus. In order to understand the present plight of this European nation, there is a need to consider the recent experiential history of Belarus and Belarusians.

At the time that the people of Belarus proclaimed the independence of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (Biełaruskaja Narodnaja Respublika or BNR) on March 25, 1918, 148 years had passed since the first of the partitions of the Commonwealth of the Two Peoples created at Lublin, which western historians have myopically called the Partitions of Poland. 148 years since a big chunk of Belarusian territory had been taken away by our Eastern neighbour. The occupation was completed in 1795, when the rest of Belarus became a province of Russia.

Tsarist rule made the 19th century one of the darkest periods of the history of Belarus. Its people barely survived as a nation. Its culture, its language, its religion, its sense of identity, its dignity had been subjected to a continuous persecution. One response and source for change came in 1918, when the people of Belarus proclaimed their independence.

The Belarusian national flag on the Government of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, Minsk, 1918

The proclamation of the independence of the Belarusian Democratic Republic has been the most important event in the history of modern Belarus. Without it, Moscow would not have accepted to create the BSSR – the Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic – in 1919 , and without the existence of the BSSR, Mr. Stanisłaŭ Šuškievič (Shushkevich) would not have been one of the signatories of the death certificate of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20^th century. Thus, it is thanks to the BNR that the independent Republic of Belarus – however imperfect it may be – exists today.

When the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic was forced into exile by the invading Bolshevik troups, it was welcomed in the Czech Republic, where its two first Presidents in Exile – Piotr Krečeŭski and Vasil Zacharka – resided until the death of Mr. Zacharka in 1943. In his will, Mr Zacharka asked Mikoła Abramčyk to take over the struggle until a new Session of the Rada could be called. At that Session, held in Germany in 1947, Mr. Abramčyk was elected the new President of the Rada, and remained in that positon until his death in 1970. His place of residence was Paris, France. His successor was Vincent Žuk-Hryškevič, a Canadian Belarusian Professor. The fifth President of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile was Dr Joseph (Jazep) Sažyč. I am the sixth President of the Rada in Exile. I have been elected at the Session of the Rada held in New York in August 1997 and reelected for another six years in 2003.

The goal of the Rada of the BNR in Exile has always been and still is to make Belarus an independent democratic Belarusian State, dedicated to implement the values expressed in the three Constituent BNR Charters of 1918. The BNR Rada continues to exist because the conditions of existence of Belarus do not satisfy its concept of a Belarusian State. The international membership of the Rada elects a new Government every six years, which pursues this longstanding mandate.

The signing of the Belavezha Treaty dissolving the Soviet Union, 1991

The first goal of the Rada, Independence, was achieved in 1991. The question most asked since then has been – why did the Rada keep its mandate when all the other Governments in Exile of the Republics of the USSR and of the Soviet Satellite states returned theirs upon achieving independence?

I will try here to answer that question and express my understanding of the reasons why the role of the Rada remains essential today.

Why are we Europe’s only Government in Exile?

 When the Soviet Union disintegrated, all Governments in Exile of the former Soviet republics and Soviet satellites returned their mandates to their homelands, except the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile.

The immense wave of hope experienced at that time made the oppressed nations believe that the end of the empire would be followed by a general renaissance of the old states harbouring the values which had been preserved for half a century by their exiled governments. It did. Belarus was one of the exceptions because the governmental structures in place had not been established through free elections.

The human factor has not played a lesser role. Because of its geopolitical interest to Russia, and its proximity to Moscow, the Belarusian territory had been more than any other Soviet republic made the homeland of a new Sovietized, totalitarian type of personality – which we know under the name of homo sovieticus. Intended to be the ideal citizen of a new Soviet order, its main characteristics were a total ignorance of his pre-Soviet past, the acceptance of the “big brother” status of Russia, the replacement of his/her mother tongue, ancestral culture and values by Russian language and Russian cultural and historical values. A sense of another “national identity” was called “bourgeois nationalism” in all non-Russian republics.

Granted that our people were not opposing Moscow’s russification policies. Having experienced two world wars on their territory and years of Soviet terror, deprived of freedom since the partitions, bereft of historical memory, Belarusians had developed incredible survival skills and had adapted to the Soviet ways of life. They were ready to accept anything, as long as there was no war.

Their skills made them one of the wealthier republics of the Soviet Union. So much so that it was literally invaded by two million non-Belarusian Soviet citizens. This is not a xenophobic statement, but rather emphasizes that this influx significantly changed the nature of the electorate in a country of ten million.

A non-democratically elected Parliament, a ”denationalized nation” (See D. Marples), a strong foreign element in the population, were not factors we could ignore, when considering the future of the Rada. I have to say that although there are many Russian émigrés in Belarus who have successfully integrated in the Belarusian society and consider themselves Belarusian, there is still a significant margin of them considering themselves Russian.

However, some key events did energize the momentum of the Belarusian opposition. The discovery of the killing grounds of Kurapaty, and the Chernobyl disaster whose consequences in Belarus had been hidden for three years by the Soviet authorities, had for a short time given rise to a “mutiny” even within the Communist structures of the republic. The small but strong opposition led by Zianon Paźniak would probably have succeeded to put an end to the populations “survival mode” if Belarusians had seen some sign of support or sympathy from the West.

The West, however, saw no interest in this relatively small state, they had considered for a long time as a Soviet creation. “We have to draw the line somewhere” said the Canadian deputy Prime Minister of the time, Sheila Copps, when our community tried to plead for help for Belarus. Among the ordinary Belarusians, hope gave way to Soviet nostalgia.

Aware of the situation, the Rada decided to wait and see. Before returning our mandate, we wanted to be sure that the independence was irreversible and Belarus would not need us any longer. We considered that the BNR Rada – a legitimate Parliament in Exile – was a tremendous asset in our hands, and we were not going to part with it without serious assurances. The decision was unanimous. And soon after, we were proven right. The new President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenka, elected in 1994, showed less than one year after his election who his masters were. In May 1995, he held his first rigged referendum by which he reintroduced the Soviet-style symbols and Russian as an official language of Belarus. In 1996, Russia rewarded him by preventing his impeachment.

Opposition demonstration in Minsk, 1996

Ever since, our goal has been to protect the statehood of Belarus, – constantly threatened by our increasingly aggressive Eastern neighbor, – while helping the democratic opposition to fight the illegitimate government of Alexander Lukashenka and create a modern European Republic of Belarus.

Our present role

In December 2001, Edward Lucas, in The Economist, quoted an Estonian exiled politician who stressed that by its very existence a government in Exile does a job.

The BNR Rada, or the Belarusian Government in Exile, could have chosen to be simply the symbol of a free Belarus. That symbol was still badly needed n Belarus. We held this role at the end of the term of my predecessor Dr Sažyč, at the beginning of the nineties, when we felt we had done all we could to put Belarus on the map of the world, and that it was the turn of the people in Belarus to fight for freedom and a better future. That was until the election of Mr. Lukashenka and the 1995 referendum.

Session of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile, 1972

The Diaspora supporting the Rada has done a lot to bring the attention to Belarus after the Chernobyl disaster. In Canada we created the Canadian Relief Fund for Chernobyl Victims in Belarus and brought thousands of children for a respite to Canada. The Diaspora in other countries helped by sending medicines to Belarus.

We understood how badly Belarus needed friends in the free world. I have been personally convinced that our defeat at the Peace Conference in Versailles of 1919, when the post-World War I international community refused to support the independence of Belarus, was due to a lack of politically placed friends. At the same time, many of our neighbours who proclaimed and preserved their independence between the two World Wars had had friends in strategic capitals…We made it a goal to find friends for Belarus.

We realized what a powerful political instrument culture can be. In order to make Belarus a member of the community of European peoples, and not just a disaster zone and “the last dictatorship in Europe”, we made it a goal to call attention to Belarusian culture wherever and however we can.

President Ivonka Survilla with the President of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, 2003

But our most important political contribution to the renaissance of Belarusian democracy, to the preservation of Belarusian culture and the protection of Belarusian statehood has been made through direct communication with friendly governments. Those who have lived through similar situations, such as the Czechs, those who have made it their goal to defend democracy in the world; such as the United States of America, those who declare that they are not ready to see human rights violated anywhere in the world; such as Canada. Each of our successes has needed, of course, convincing, presence, and communication on our part. But it has been easier to achieve when we have worked through our established communities in the countries whose help we need, and together with the democratic Opposition in Belarus.

A good example of this activity was the recent Appeal to the European Union, which I signed before the Prague Summit together with Mr. Šuškievič, the first head of State of independent Belarus, Mr. Paźniak, a presidential candidate in 1994 and past leader of the Opposition in the Parliament of the Republic of Belarus, and Mr. Kazulin, the Rector of the State University of Minsk, who was jailed for two years and a half after having competed with Mr. Lukashenka at the rigged 2006 presidential elections. Together with another Presidential candidate of 2006, Mr. Milinkievič, we met with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the President of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission of the Czech Republic. We thanked the European Union for accepting Belarus into the Eastern Partnership Program in spite of the dictatorial regime of Mr. Lukashenka, while expressing our fear that Europe’s stretched hand may be misused to legitimize the regime instead of serving the people of Belarus. We have asked Europe to include Belarusian civil society into the agreement. And, since the Partnership may prolong Mr. Lukashenka’s stay in power, we have asked Europe to protect Belarusian culture and values, which are presently being destroyed or persecuted in Belarus, and may be totally extinct by the end of his reign. This common appeal has been heard by the Czech hosts of the Summit, who will pass it on to Sweden, the next presiding State of the European Union.

Presodent Ivonka Survilla with Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic

The example I have provided was an event held in the Czech Republic, a long-time friend of the BNR Rada. I have been received there several times at the highest levels. As a representative of a government in Exile, I would probably not have been invited for consultations by France or Germany. The success of our endeavours depends very much on who we are dealing with. As I said, the countries who have been in a similar situation to ours understand well the significance of a Government in Exile. But in most cases, dealing with a Government in Exile is perceived as a conflict of interests, especially where commerce or a given political interest is involved, such as the issue of the Arctic population in the case of Canada and Russia. We understand that quite well. And, at the same time, we have been worried more than once that a rapprochement between the United States and Russia, for example, could theoretically take place at the expense of Russia’s coveted neighbours. I only hope at this specific moment in time that Mr. Obama’s administration is well aware of Russia’s imperialistic instincts.

BNR Rada and Belarus

Last but not least, I would like to address the issue of the relations of the BNR Rada with Belarus. According to many, we have been the light of hope, which has led our freedom fighters in Belarus to our common goal – the independence of our land. Outside Belarus, we have preserved the language, the historical memory, the national identity when they were being erased from the surface of this planet in Belarus. During the period of renewal at the beginning of the nineties, the President of the BNR Rada, Dr Sažyč has been welcome in Belarus as an honourable guest.

We became “the enemies of the people” – together with the Belarusian democratic opposition, – as soon as Mr. Lukashenka became President of the Republic of Belarus in 1994. In a speech at the Russian Duma in 1998, he informed his friendly audience, that a rival of his, a certain Sulvilla or Survilla – an émigré of the first WW and now 97 years old – (a man of course) – was supported by the West. After the Prague Appeal was signed by myself and the main representatives of the Belarusian democratic opposition, asking Europe not to legitimize the regime by inviting Mr Lukashenka to the Prague summit, he lumped us all into the “enemies of the people” category.

The national white-red-white flag, the historical coat of arms Pahonia, the very mention of the Rada are taboo in Belarus, except when the intent is their denigration by the propaganda machine. No lie is too enormous to fight us. The brain washing is successful among the ordinary Belarusians who have no access to unbiased information. Thus, we are not always the allies to brag about for the opposition.

Our relationship with most parties of the opposition is however good. When we attend together international events, whatever our difference of thinking, we all know our common goal is to preserve the statehood of Belarus and to make it a free, European democracy. As for the future of the Rada, we can’t wait to be able to give back our mandate to a democratically elected Belarusian government. Our role at that time will very much depend on the free will of the people of Belarus. It will be up to them to decide what kind of democracy they will have. If we feel we cannot be of any use in Belarus, we will continue to look for friends for our people, whom they so tragically lacked in the past centuries.

There is no doubt that a government in Exile is an exotic idea for many. Such a government exists out of necessity and operates according to many challenges, dilemmas and varying acknowledgments of its empowerment. My experience in this organism has been at times frustrating, at times satisfying. I have been privy to the variety of perceptions of Belarus and the correlations between global buy-in and the willingness to understand the conditions of existence of such a government. But whether the Rada is universally accepted is less important than our constancy of presence. We function on the idea that we are part of a process toward democracy, and that by our existence we can mediate the political nuances that must be understood in order to change conditions in Belarus.

Ivonka J. Survilla

I have the honour to be the sixth president in exile of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic. The BNR Rada is the longest-living government in exile. It left Belarus close to 90 years ago because of the aggression and the subsequent occupation of our independent state by our communist neighbour.

Communism can be examined according to its large scale, long-term impact on the lives of individual human beings and also according to the impact on the appropriated nations, nations that do not define the political and cultural epicentre of communist power, but rather find themselves in forced subjugation. This is the reality and legacy of the communist experience, felt by many nations in modern times, evidenced by Tibet’s real-time struggle and by countries like Belarus who continue to experience the fallout of the Soviet experience.

While the academic conceptualisation of the communist experience is usually articulated on a theoretical level, I would like to begin this testimony on a personal level. Because of communist aggression, I lost my homeland at the age of eight; I grew up as a refugee and have lived most of my life far from my people, from my culture, from my
extended family. I had to adapt to four new cultures before I reached the age of 12. At the age of three, I was deprived of the presence of my father while he was in Soviet jail. My grandfather died while being deported to Siberia. My only sister died at the age of 18 months as a consequence of the ordeal my family went through while fleeing the Soviets.

I am one of the six million Belarusians whose life has been altered or destroyed by what we still call communism, but what in fact is a deficient ideology which has become a powerful tool in the hands of a corrupt and amoral neighbouring empire. Three generations of Belarusians have been victimised by the communist ideology used to brainwash or terrorise a nation into submission. The effects of this process are an exacerbated survival instinct that continues to deprive the people of Belarus of the most basic of human rights – freedom.

The forced collectivisation, from the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1950s, affected the totality of the Belarusian rural community and resulted in 350,000 deaths (Zaprudnik, 1998). Mass murder, as evidenced by the mass graves of Kurapaty near Minsk, uncovered 20 years ago by Zianon Pazniak, who is going to present a paper later today, and the many other mass graves in Belarus, contain the remains of hundreds of thousands of innocent Belarusians who died as a result of Stalinist purges between 1937 and 1941. One in every four Belarusians died as a result of World War II, which was partly fought on Belarusian territory. Both German Nazis and Soviet Russia must be held responsible for this slaughter.

The post-war purges in Belarus and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Belarusians to Siberia up until the end of the 1960s are another chapter of the history of Soviet Belarus. The way the authorities have dealt with the Chernobyl catastrophe is another example of the inhuman genocidal policies of the Soviet regime. In 1950, my predecessor, Mikola Abramtchik, published his famous “I accuse the Kremlin of genocide of my nation”. The concept of “captive nations” has come to be widely used. It was clear to all of us that the perpetrators of the new wave of crimes against humanity were the rulers in the Kremlin. Communist ideology had become a marketing tool used to extend Russia’s rule to as many hotspots in the world as possible. Little did we, the Belarusian diaspora, know up to the very end of the 1980s that Moscow had completed its cynical task of brainwashing the people of Belarus into believing that Russia was in fact the benevolent “big brother” without whom they had no chance to survive. The Russian-speaking homo sovieticus was born.

The second category of the Kremlin’s crimes against the people of Belarus was intended not only to subjugate but to erase from the maps of the world the very existence of the country of Belarus and of the nation which had lived on its territory for a thousand years. The first offence in that category was the aggression and destruction of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in 1918 and the division of Belarus by the Treaty of Riga. The territory of the Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic, which was created to replace the independent Belarusian Democratic Republic, was reduced to a fraction of the ethnic territory of Belarus. I would count in this category the extermination of Belarusian writers, artists, politicians and the vast majority of the national intelligentsia which lasted from the end of the 1920s to the end of the 1930s. According to historian Jan Zaprudnik, “Of the 238 writers arrested during the years of repression, only about 20 survived. The Belarusian Academy of Sciences lost ‘nearly 90 percent’ of its members.” (Zaprudnik, 1993).

Our historical memory and the Belarusian language – the very foundation of our national identity – were for most of the 20th century and still are the victims of the Soviet imperial policies and of their most loyal present-day disciple, Alexander Lukashenka. I would like to mention that in 1990, there was not a single Belarusian school in the capital of Belarus, Minsk. Our churches were blown up, our material heritage has been destroyed not only by war, but through political mandate, because is was material proof of the long existence of a highly civilised European country. Belarusian history runs in the face of Soviet attempts to suggest that nothing of value had existed in the land before 1919.

The most serious threat to the existence of Belarus, however, still is Moscow’s desire to make it a province of the Russian Federation, whose goals are surprisingly similar to those of the Soviet Empire. This was clearly stated by Mr Putin in August 2002. The second most serious threat to the existence of our nation has been the damage which communist propaganda, fed to our people for close to a century, has done to their self-perception, critical thinking and sense of place. It will take many generations to normalise the right to explore, to feel pride, to simply be after such a deeply scarring colonial experience.

You may have noticed that for me as a Belarusian, communism is closely linked to our eastern neighbour using communist ideology as a tool to achieve its expansionist goals. But communism has affected the lives not only of people who have been ruled by its adepts in the Soviet Union. This has also been the case of millions of people who have been affected by the actions of communist sympathisers in the world who, as President Havel said it, have often unknowingly been helping delinquent regimes to continue perpetrating crimes against humanity and who are at this time helping the Russian Empire to regain its strength.

After our family escaped the Soviet Empire, my father considered it his mission to explain to anybody he met and mainly to the French intellectuels de gauche – we lived in France at that time – what living under communism meant. At my father’s funeral, a good friend told me that he realised my father was telling the truth only after the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968… For 20 years this friend, who was a lawyer and had every chance to verify the facts, was obviously not able to admit that he was wrong. This is probably also why there are still people in Belarus who readily believe the propaganda of the present regime.

We rarely learn from the mistakes of the past. I hope, however, that the time will come when the Soviet lesson will be learned by the thinking portion of humanity.

Thank you.

IVONKA SURVILLA President of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile, Civic Leader and Artist, Canada

Studied Art at the Parisian École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux Arts and is a graduate of the Sorbonne (1959). Since 1969, she has been living in Ottawa, working for the government and also engaged in Belarusian civic, scholarly and artistic activities. Founded and headed (1989–1997) the Canadian Relief Fund for Chernobyl Victims in Belarus. In 1997, elected President of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile.

This article chronicles the history of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR) and its Council (Rada) from the time of its fleeing Red Army occupiers in 1920 until the present day. It discusses the Belarusian experience in comparison to those of other exiled governments, particularly that of Ukraine. Finally, it suggests that Western governments should both take cognizance of this historical democratic tradition and give the present Rada appropriate policy attention in considering relations with post-Soviet Belarus.

Most of the countries of east central Europe benefited from the surge of democratic idealism which flowed from World War I, as expounded most ardently, perhaps, by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Poland broke free from the yoke of nearly 150 years of great power partition. Czechoslovakia emerged from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the most stunningly successful democracy of the interwar period in the region. Hungary achieved independent status as did the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The striving for democracy, too, touched the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples. Both achieved independence and democratic governance, albeit for much shorter periods of time than the above-mentioned countries mainly due to their closer proximity to Bolshevist Russia. Regrettably, these efforts at national self-determination-particularly in the case of Belarus-were largely ignored by the Western powers.

The democratic experience in this region came to a screeching halt through a combination of sovietization and World War II. Democratically elected governments went into exile. The better known cause by which these governments fled their homelands-and the one which led the West to recognize such governments-was Hitler’s invasion of East Central Europe.

Perhaps most illustrative of this “model” was the Polish experience. With the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the Polish government evacuated to various locales in the south and east, eventually seeking refuge in Romania. Later, the Polish government-in-exile established itself in England, where it remained until the end of the war. As chronicled in The History of Poland Since 1863, edited by R. F. Leslie, Western support for this government waned rapidly at the end of the war as Churchill and Roosevelt sought to reach agreements with Stalin over future arrangements in Poland and elsewhere. The book’s assertion, however, that the government-in-exile ” . . . was never again to play a part in Polish affairs” (p. 279) is incorrect. In fact, the government continued in existence until December 1990 when the leadership transferred its authority to President Lech Walesa during his inauguration.

Other victims of the German invasion and/or the cynical division of the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, which preceded Hitler’s invasion of the USSR itself, also established governments in exile. The Baltic states were notable in this regard. All three were recognized by many Western governments; in the case of the United States this recognition allowed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to maintain diplomatic representations in Washington throughout the postwar Soviet period. Convoluted rules for contacts by U.S. diplomats in those Soviet “republics” kept alive the unique status of these countries until they were able to resume their independent, democratic courses with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The lesser known “model” by which governments in the region went into exile is much older. It applies only to Ukraine and Belarus. As World War I was drawing down, movements for national self-determination developed among both peoples. In the Ukrainian case-as documented and analyzed carefully by Professor D. Doroshenko in his 1939 book, History of the Ukraine -the essence of a highly complex set of factors is that a pluralistically founded Ukrainian Democratic Republic was established in the late 1917, proclaiming full Ukrainian independence from Russia. With various mutations and boundary alterations, the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and its government continued to exist until autumn 1920. Then, with the Polish-Soviet conflict ending via the eventual Treaty of Riga (ratified in 1921), the Red Army was able to focus on the Ukrainians, who were eventually routed and forced to flee into Polish territory. From that point the Ukrainian Democratic Republic existed in exile.

Although the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been recognized by a number of countries (perhaps as many as twenty, some establishing diplomatic or consular representations in Kiev), when its government went into exile it received little or no international support or recognition. The government continued to exist, however, eventually transforming itself into the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. With the collapse of the USSR and establishment of an independent Ukraine, spirited discussions took place among Ukrainian emigres as to the desirability of terminating the government-in-exile and returning its authorities to the newly independent government in Kiev. Despite the view of many that it was too soon to judge the sincerity of the new government, plus the fact that the existing parliament had been elected during the Soviet period, the majority favored returning the exiled government to the homeland. Thus, the last Ukrainian president-in-exile, Mikola Plaviuk, a Canadian citizen, returned the authority of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic to the government of Leonid Kravchuk in 1992. Plaviuk himself resumed residence in Ukraine, where he lives today.

This brings us to the Belarusian case, by far the least known or understood of all the instances in which democratically based governments in East Central Europe were forced into exile. As noted above, like Ukraine, Belarus’ democrats pursued and achieved independence in the maelstrom of events surrounding the close of World War I, the rise of Bolshevism, and the aura of Wilsonian democratic idealism which quickly permeated into the mentalities of long-repressed peoples of the region.

As documented by Professor Jan Zaprudnik in his book Belarus at a Crossroads in History (p. 67 and following), beginning in March 1917 various Belarusian parties and organizations convened to foster statehood for Belarus. Following the failure of the Bolsheviks in November 1917 to include autonomy for Belarus in their program, according to Prof. Zaprudnik the next month a coalition of Belarusian organizations and parties convened the All-Belarusian Congress in Miensk. The Congress, he notes, proclaimed Belarus a democratic republic. “On the following day, the delegates handed over their power to the Rada of the Congress, whose executive committee continued to lead the national movement from underground.” (Zaprudnik, p. 67). Inter alia, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918, ending World War I, divided Belarus among neighboring states. This caused the Executive Committee, in its Third Constituent Charter issued March 25, 1918, to proclaim the Belarusian Democratic Republic as an independent and free state. (Zaprudnik, p. 68-70)

Thus was a broadly based, democratic Belarusian state created. From March though December of 1918, the new government in Miensk organized itself, establishing an administration and creating its own military units. The government also began an active diplomatic initiative to seek recognition in the world community. Unfortunately, this latter was not successful. Belarus’ geographic location between Russia and Poland-and long historical occupation by one or the other, or both-led few countries to recognize the new state and its government. Among those who did, however, were Germany, Turkey, and Ukraine. The United States did not.

The Polish-Soviet War alluded to above also had adverse consequences for the fragile new country of Belarus. With the cessation of hostilities in the autumn of 1920, Poland and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic agreed on the redivision of Belarus more or less coincident with Poland’s pre-partition eastern boundary. The new Belarus army fought bravely but futilely to forestall this fate, particularly at a major engagement in the Sxuck region in the fall of 1920. Western Belarus reverted to Poland, and the Soviets created a new Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, with its capital at Smolensk.

Starting in late 1919, the core of the Belarusian Democratic Republic’s Executive Council (BNR Rada) emigrated, seeking political exile abroad. As with the Ukrainians, these Belarusian democrats found refuge in newly independent (and strongly democratic) Czechoslovakia. Belarus’ first president, Piotra Kreceuski, and his deputy, Vasil Zacharka, took up residence in Prague, where the main body of the BNR Rada was eventually established. (One BNR faction remained behind in the now-divided country but ceased to function as an organized political group.)

The Prague group, under Kreceuski’s leadership, was active politically, developing a wide political agenda. Interestingly, the Rada at that time sent a BNR emissary to the United States, Mr. Jazep Varonka, who had been Prime Minister of the 1919-20 BNR government in Belarus itself. (Reportedly, the U.S. government told Varonka that it could not grant the BNR recognition since the “official government” of Belarus was in Miensk, i.e., under Soviet control.)

Beginning in 1924, the Bolsheviks sought to weaken (and eventually eliminate) the Prague group, ostensibly seeking rapprochement by sending emissaries on several visits to the Rada-in-exile. The Soviets apparently felt the BNR continued to have emotional and national importance, thus requiring its elimination. This effort culminated in October 1925 with a conference in Berlin, at which several Rada members renounced their affiliation with the BNR and returned to their homeland. The Rada, headed by Krece`ski, nonetheless continued to function in Prague.

From 1925 through 1939, the BNR Rada in Prague was the sole political representation of Belarusian statehood abroad. Mr. Kreceuski died in 1928; his deputy, Mr. Zacharka, was elected head of the Rada. In 1939 and 1940, the Nazis approached Zacharka with a view to seeking the Rada’s collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union. Zacharka refused.

During the war, the BNR Rada was obviously inactive, but with the war over, and having moved to Paris, the BNR leadership reactivated itself. Mikola Abramcyk succeeded Mr. Zacharka (who had died in 1943) as President (starssynia) of the Rada. Abramcyk, in particular, devoted great efforts to visiting and assisting Belarusian refugees in Germany and elsewhere. He had extensive political contacts with Washington, Paris, and other capitals and took an active part in a non-Russian emigre organization, the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, also known as the Paris Bloc. The Bloc, of which he was president, included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, North Caucasus and Ukraine.

In the meantime, activists in German-occupied Belarus had established a “Belarusian Central Rada”, headed by Radaslau Astrouski, shortly before the end of World War II. This group was strongly anticommunist in nature, and many of its members successfully emigrated abroad as the Germans fell back from occupied territories. While significant remnants of this Rada are still active in the Belarusian diaspora, many have associated themselves with the BNR Rada.

The BNR Rada has functioned continuously since 1948 (and indeed since 1919 except for the hiatus caused by World War II). From the spring of 1946 through 1988, nineteen sessions of the Rada took place, reviewing activities of the BNR and adopting future policies and programs. As presently constituted, the Rada has over 50 members, including a President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Foreign Relations Liaison. Dr. Barys Ragula, a Canadian citizen and prominent physician, is currently Acting President of the Rada, succeeding Dr. Jazep Sazyc.

As with the BNR Rada, the governments-in-exile of other East Central European countries represented both legitimacy and democracy for their countries and countrymen during periods when other types of regimes were imposed by force. In cases where democratically based governments were forced out by Hitler’s Germany, the United States and other Western countries typically recognized those governments-in-exile until such time as conditions permitted the return to democratic governance. Regrettably, that was not the case with regard to democratically inclined governments based on national self-determination in Belarus and Ukraine.

The fact remains, however, that the BNR Rada provides the one unbroken, continuous link of democratic pluralism between Belarus’ one and only period of nation-state existence (1918-1920) and the restoration of independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Unlike its Ukrainian analog, the BNR Rada chose to withhold recognition and return of authority to the new leadership in Belarus. It did so because the legislature was of the Soviet period, i e. not democratically elected, and because of skepticism over the course of democratic reform in the executive branch of government.

With the benefit of hindsight, this decision would appear to have been quite prescient. The Western world is unanimous in its view that the current state of governance in Belarus is neither democratic nor reached democratically. Therefore, the chalice of Belarusian democratic tradition and national legitimacy should naturally continue to reside with the Belarusian diaspora.

But what are the implications of this for Western governments? There are at least two. First, it is important for the West to take cognizance of and give recognition to historical facts. In this case that means a government-in-exile that was created democratically, forced out of its homeland by a physically more powerful but morally corrupt regime, and has maintained a continuous democratic tradition up to the present time.

Secondly, the West should welcome formal contacts at all levels with the BNR Rada. This is needed to assure that governmental decisions concerning Belarusian affairs to the greatest extent possible incorporate the policy desiderata of those with whom resides the legacy of the one historical expression of Belarus’ national self-determination. To do otherwise would be unfair to Belarusians themselves-both those who reside within the country and those in diaspora.

by David H. Swartz, U.S. Ambassador to Belarus from 1992 to 1994.

Spring 1997 issue, vol. 9, no. 1, of the Belarusian Review.
Posted by permission of Belarusian Review. © Copyright Belarusian Review.

“…We, the Council (Rada) of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, have cast off from our native land the last vestige of national dependence which the Russian tsars imposed by force upon our free and independent land. From this time on, the Belarusian Democratic Republic is proclaimed and independent and free state.”

Those are the words from the Declaration Independence made by the Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Minsk on 25 March 1918. The independence did not last long owing to unfavourable political situation. All the same, from that day on Belarusians all over the world keep the 25 March as their Independence Day.

Belarus became part of the Russian Empire as a result of partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772-95. The tsarist authorities regarded it simply as the North-Western province (Severo-zapadnyi krai) of Russia, inhabited by people speaking a kind of peasant Russian dialect. Consequently all signs of individuality were systematically eradicated, including the destruction of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church to which the majority of Belarusians belonged. The opposite view was held by Poles, or rather by polonised Belarusian landed gentry, for whom Belarus was a Polish province. Despite this, Belarusian national movement began to manifest itself early in the 19th century, and gathered momentum especially after emancipation of peasants in 1861.

In 1862 the revolutionary leader Kastus Kalinouski (hanged by Russians in 1864) began publishing clandestine paper Muzhytskaia prauda (Peasant truth). Some twenty years later the Belarusian group of the movement Narodnaia volia (People’s freedom) in their underground paper Homon was already raising the question of Belarusian autonomy. The end of the 19th century saw also the appearance of new Belarusian writers and poets, the most prominent of whom was Frantsishak Bahushevich (1840-1900) who reminded the Belarusians: “Do not abandon our Belarusian tongue that we may not die”. But it was not until 1903 that the first Belarusian party, the Belaruskaia Revaliutsyinaia Hramada (Belarusian Revolutionary Party) was founded. Two years later, under its definitive name of Belaruskaia sacyialistychnaia hramada (Belarusian Socialist Party) it played an active role in the revolution of 1905-1907.

In the years that followed members of the Hramada were closely connected with the newspaper Nasha niva (Our field) which, until its closure in 1915 was the focal point of Belarusian political and cultural life. The Hramada was the only Belarusian political party during that period. Other parties then active in the area – Russian, Polish, Jewish, – were, with few exceptions, indifferent or even openly hostile to Belarusian national aspirations.

One year after the outbreak of the First World War, in summer 1915, Belarus was divided by the frontline between German and Russian armies. The hardships caused by the war were aggravated by the refugee problem: before abandoning Western Belarus to the Germans, the Russian authorities evacuated over a million of its inhabitants who were taken inside Russia and largely left to their own fate. This was the situation in Belarus at the time of the February Revolution of 1917. From then on the events began to move rapidly.

The Provisional Russian government of Kerenski was replaced in November 1917 by a Communist one who, in their turn, in February 1918, abandoned the area to the Germans. In December of the same year the Germans retreated, and Communist Soviet rule was established again in Belarus with the exception of the Hrodna region in the West. During the late spring and early summer of 1919 Belarus was invaded by Poles who remained there until summer 1920.

Against this background of ever-changing political scene the Belarusians tried to establish their own independent state. Their efforts led to the convocation in December 1917 in Minsk of the All-Belarusian Congress and, finally the proclamation on 25 March 1918 of the independent Belarusian Democratic Republic (Belaruskaia Narodnaia Respublika, abbreviated as BNR). The odds were, however, against them. In December the Council and Government of the BNR left Minsk and established themselves in Hrodna which at that time was the centre of a semi-autonomous Belarusian region within the Lithuanian Republic. The Polish invasion in spring of 1919 put an end to this, and the government of the BNR went into exile. The hopes of some of its members that the Poles would help in re-establishing Belarusian independence were soon dispelled.

In the meantime the Soviet authorities who, like the Russian Provisional Government before them, were hostile to the idea of Belarusian independence, began to take notice of the strong national feelings among Belarusians and of the pressure exerted by various Belarusian refugee organisations inside Russia. On 1 January 1919 the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (abbreviated as BSSR; initially it was called Soviet Socialist Republic of Belarus or SSRB) was proclaimed. The new “state” did not exist long as a separate entity: In February of the same year it became part of a new creation called the Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As the hopes of establishing Soviet rule in Lithuania receded, the idea of the latter was abandoned, and in summer 1920 the BSSR was restored in its pristine form. Territorially, however, the Republic comprised only a tiny part of Eastern Belarus (six counties of the Minsk province), while the Western part remained under Polish domination. This partition of Belarus was finally ratified in 1921 by the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Riga, and lasted until 1939.

The foregoing account may give an idea of the complexity of the problem faced by the student of Belarusian history during the first two decades of the 20th century. His task is not made easier by the absence of reliable bibliographical guide. What follows is not intended to be such a guide, but merely a description of relevant material available in the Francis Skaryna Belarusian Library in London.

Among the few bibliographical works there is A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia by N. Vakar (Harvard U.P. 1956). Its section on the period in question (Nos 1022-1160 and 1384-1590 is useful at least as a beginning. Another work, Bibliahrafiia pa historyi Belarusi by M. Krakene and A. Sakol’chyk (Minsk 1969), contains a large section (Nos 3782-4453) on the period from 1900 to the February 1917. Only works in Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian are listed, and by no means not all of them. Works of authors such as U. Ihnatouski, A. Stankievich, A. Lutskievich, A. Tsvikievich, J. Naidziuk and others have been omitted.

To understand the events of 1900-1921 a knowledge of preceding period at least from 1861 is useful. An account of the whole period 1861-1921 in vols. 2 and 3 of the five-volume “academic” Historyia Belaruskai SSR (Minsk 1971-75) represents the official Soviet point of view, and suffers from the usual defects of works of this kind, namely partiality and omission of inconvenient facts. The new “academic” work, Narysy pa historyi Belarusi, ed. Kastsiuk et al. (2 vols., Minsk 1994-95), is an attempt at a more balanced view of history. The other general works on Belarus history, including chapters on the period in question, are Belarus uchora i siannia by J. Naidziuk (Minsk 1943; 2nd ed. Minsk 1993); Weissruthenien: Volk und Land by E. von Engelhardt (Berlin 1943); and Belorussia: the Making of the Nation by N. Vakar (Harvard U.P. 1957), the latter being written in a somewhat patronising tone. The latest addition is J. Zaprudnik’s Belarus at the crossroads of History (Boulder-Oxford 1993; Belarusian edition Minsk 1996). Historyia Belarusi XIX i pachatku XX staletstsia by U. Ihnatouski (Minsk 1926) deals with the period of Belarusian history from the beginning of the 19th century to 1921. Da historyi belaruskaha palitychnaha vyzvalennia by A. Stankevich (Vilna 1934) is an interesting study of the Belarusian national movement between the years 1862-1921. Another work, covering roughly the same period, but concentrating particularly on the years 1905-1920, is Belorusskoe dvizhenie by F. Turuk (Moscow 1921; reprint Minsk 1992). It is a comprehensive and factual study of the period in question, written with rare objectivity and supported by the mass of documentary evidence. Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Belorussii (1863-1917) by S. Agurski (Minsk 1928) is also well documented. Unlike Turuk, however, its author is mainly concerned with non-Belarusian parties, especially RSDRP (as the Communist party was then called).

Byelorussian Statehood, ed. V. & Z. Kipel (New York 1988) is a source book on the Belarusian history of 1917-21, containing writings of persons who were directly involved in the events of 1917-1921, such us Krecheuski, Varonka, Zakharka etc., articles by historians J. Zaprudnik, P. Urban and J. Menski, biographical notes on over 60 Belarusian leaders of the period, bibliography and chronological table of events. It is a must for everyone interested in the history of Belarusian struggle for national independence.

There is a scarcity of published documents on the period in question. The bulky vols. 3 and 4 of Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Belorussii (Minsk 1953 & 1954), contain documents of 1900-1917 and 1917-1919 resp., all in Russian, and one would in vain look in them for any mention of Belarus, let alone BNR. As far as Belarusian documents are concerned, apart from the above mentioned book by Turuk (39 documents), one should mention Kryvavy shliakh belaruskai natsdemokratyi by A. Ziuzkou (Minsk 1932). The author, hostile to Belarusian national movement, in an appendix gives texts of 31 documents of 1917-21.

Another major collection (58 documents) is found in Za dziarzhaunuiu nezalezhnasts Belarusi, ed. I. Kasiak (London 1960). A truly monumental work is Arkhivy Belaruskai Narodnai Respubliki, ed. S.Shupa (2 books, Vilna-New York 1998), containing over 3000 documents of the BNR from the Lithuanian State Archives.

Among the works on the period 1900-1917 there is first of all Za dvatstsats piats hadou by A. Lutskevich (Vilna 1928; 2nd ed. Minsk 1991, with postscript by A. Sidarevich). The author, one of the pioneers of the Belarusian national movement, traces the history of the first Belarusian political party, the Belaruskaia Satsyialistychnaia Hramada, and remembers the persons and events connected with it. The chapter “Belaruskaie natsyianalnaie adradzhennie (1902-1915)” in the book Z historyi Belarusi by J. Stankievich (Munich 1958) contains much interesting material on the Belarusian national movement, in which the author took active part. An assessment of the role played by the Communists in Belarusian movement is found in Bol’shevizm v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii Belorussii by N. Nedasek (Munich 1956). An important aspect of the Belarusian national activities before 1917 is considered in J. Zaprudnik’s doctoral thesis Political struggle for Byelorussia in the Tsarist State Dumas 1906-1917 (Typescript, New York 1966) and a number of his articles on the same subject, such as “The struggle for Byelorussia’s Autonomy in the First State Duma” (The Journal of Byelorussian Studies, Vol.II, No.3, London 1971), and “Byelorussia’s Representatives in the Second State Duma” (Ibid., Vol.III, No.3, 1975). The development of Belarusian press, and in particular the newspaper Nasha niva, is the subject of the book Putsiaviny rodnaha slova by S. Aleksandrovich (Minsk 1971), and the article “Nasha niva” by the present writer (The Journal of Byelorussian Studies, Vol. I, No.3, 1967). Incidentally the sets of papers Nasha dolia (1906), and Nasha niva for the years (1906-1909) are now available in facsimile editions. Belaruski litaraturna-hramadski rukh u Petsiarburze by R. Semashkevich (Minsk 1971) is a study of the Belarusian colony (mainly students) in St Petersburg and their role in the Belarusian national movement.

There are several eyewitness accounts of the events from February 1917 to 1921. E. Kancher, his Belorusskii vopros (Petrograd 1919) left one of the first written accounts of the All-Belarusian Congress of December 1917 and the events leading to the proclamation of independence on 25 March 1918, of which he was not in favour. J. Varonka, the first prime minister of BNR, gave his version of events in Belaruski rukh ad 1917 da 1920 hodu (Kaunas 1920).

Other contemporary publications are Korotkii ocherk vozniknoveniia Belorusskoi Narodnoi Respubliki by A. Tsvikevich (Kiev 1918), and Uskhodniaia Belarus by A.I. (Minsk 1918), the latter giving a detailed picture of the growth of Belarusian movement leading to the declaration independence. There is also the first and only issue of the journal Varta (Minsk 1918), a semi-official organ of the Belarusian Government. P. Krecheuski, a member of the first Belarusian government and later President of the Council (Rada) of the BNR writes about the events of 1917-18 in his article “Belarus u minulym i suchasnym” in the first (and only) issue of the journal Zamiezhnaia Belarus (Prague 1926).

“Da Piershaha Usiebelaruskaha Ziezdu 1917” ed. I. Zaprudnik (Zapisy, Munich, No.2,1963; No.3, 1964; No. 4, 1966) is a useful collection of materials and documents on the All-Belarusian Congress, compiled from publications, not easily accessible today .

Attempts to form Belarusian army are described in various articles, such as “Belaruskiia vaiskovyia farmatsyi na Rumynskim frontsie” by S.K. (the journal Kryvich, No.1, Kaunas 1923), “Belaruskaia Vaiskovaia Tsentralnaia Rada” by K. Iezavitau (Ibid., No.7, 1924, No.9, 1925); “Histarychny kalendar belaruskikh addzielau litouskaha voiska” by A. Sam. (Krynitsa, Vilna, No.4, 1939; Nos 7, 16, 27, 40, 1940); “Piershy belaruski polk u Horadni i iak paliaki razbroili iaho” by A. Uspienski (Ranitsa, Berlin, No.44, 1943, et seq); “25 Uhodki Horadzienskaie Hubernskaie Upravy” by V.B. (ibid. No.49-50, 1943; 1-2, 1944). The only issue of Na chuzhynie (Riga 1920), organ of gen. S. Buklakh-Balakhovich and his “private army”, is of interest for the study of this controversial figure who caused BNR more embarrassment than help. Bialoruskie formacje wojskowe 1917-1923 by O. Latyszonek (Bialystok 1995) is the first comprehensive study of Belarusian military units. Another recent publication is “Polskaia palityka na Bielarusi u chasie Polska-Balshavitskaie vainy 1919-1920 h.” by F. Kushal in his Sproby stvarennia belaruskaha voiska (Minsk 1999).

Very little was written about BNR by Soviet historians, and almost invariably in a negative manner. The book by Ziuzkou (see above) is a good example. Among the more recent publications there are Niepazbiezhnaie bankrutstva by M. Stashkievich (Minsk 1974), and also his and I. Kovkel’s Pochemu ne sostoialas BNR (Minsk1980), with its English version Why was the BNR never formed (Minsk 1983). On the other hand there is great number of works on the establishment of the Belarusian Soviet Republic, practically all suffering of the same defect, namely one-sidedness and suppression of inconvenient facts. Such are Utvarennie Belaruskai Sacyialistychnai Respubliki (Minsk 1946) and Belorusskii narod v bor’be za sovetskuiu vlast’ (Minsk 1963) by N. Kamenskaia; Sozdanie i uprochnenie belorusskoi gosudarstvennosti by S. Margunskii (Minsk 1958); Pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Belorussii, ed. I. Mints (Minsk 1967). More serious, although still in the same spirit is Rozhdenie Belorusskoi Sovetskoi Respubliki by V. Krutalevich (Minsk 1975). His most recent work, Stanovlenie natsional’noi derzhavnosti (Minsk 1999), written in somewhat different circumstances, contains a wealth of concrete material. Among works by non-Soviet writers one should mention Bol’shevizm na putiakh k ustanovleniiu kontrolia nad Belorussiu by N. Nedasek (Munich 1954), and his “National self-determination under the Soviets” (Belorussian Review, No.8, Munich 1960), as well as “The Establishment of the Belorussian SSR” by J. Menski (ibid, No.1, 1955).

Belarusian-Polish relations, and in particular the Polish occupation of 1919-1920, are dealt with in Adradzhennie Belarusi i Polshcha by A. Tsvikievich (Berlin 1921); Belorussy i poliaki by K. Iezavitau (Kaunas 1919); Belorusskii vopros k momentu Versal’skoi Mirnoi Konferentsii by I. Varonka (Kaunas 1919); Polskaia akupatsyia Belarusi by A. Lutskievich (Vilna 1920); Uspaminy ab polskai akupatsyi Hrodzienshchyny by I. Antonau (n.p. 1921); and in the clandestine journal Sielanskaia dolia (n.p. 1921-22). The Polish position with regard to Belarus is stated in Les confins orientaux de la Pologne (Paris 1919), an official publication for the Versailles Conference. Other works include Zywiol polski na ziemiach litewskich by M. Swiechowski (Zakopane 1917), Polska a Litwa i Bialorus by J. Sorokowicz (Warsaw 1919); Panstwo polskie a kwestia bialoruska by Szczesny Bronowski (Warsaw 1919); Litwa i Bialorus by L. Wasilewski (Warsaw 1925); Sprawa bialoruska by S. Elski (Warsaw 1931); Federaliam. Litwa i Bialorus w polityce obozu Belwederskiego (XI 1918 – IV 1920) by J. Lewandowski (Warsaw 1962); Polityka wschodnia Polski wobec ziem Litwy, Bialorusi i Ukrainy (1918-1919) by A. Deruga (Warsaw 1969) and others.

The position of Belarusian Catholics and their role in the Belarusian national life have been studied by A. Stankievich in his Rodnaia mova u sviatyniakh (Vilna 1929) and Bielaruski khrystsiianski rukh (Vilna 1939). K. Svaiak (Fr. K. Stepovich) in his diary Dzieia maioi mysli, serca i voli (Vilna 1932; 2nd ed. London 1991), draws the picture of difficulties encountered by a Belarusian Catholic priest in his pastoral work. An interesting work, dealing to great extent with this subject is Stosunek Biskupa Jerzego Matulewicza do spraw jezykowych w Diecezji Wilenskiej, 1918-1925, by T. Gorski (Warsaw 1970). No similar work exists with regard to the Orthodox Church, but some information may be found in the book Belarus by Archbp Afanasi (Buenos Aires 1966; 2nd ed. Minsk 1990).

Much useful information can be found in the contemporary papers, namely Homan (Vilna 1916-1918), Bielaruskae zhytstsio (Vilna 1919); Belarus (Minsk 1919-1920).
There are incomplete sets of these publications in the F. Skaryna Library. Starting with 1989 many interesting and valuable articles and hitherto inaccessible materials have appeared in journals Polymia, Neman, Belaruski histarychny chasopis and especially Spadchyna, all published in Minsk.

The foregoing description does not pretend to be a complete bibliography, but it is hoped that it shows the wealth of material on the struggle of Belarusians for their national identity early in the 20th century, and the proclamation independence on 25 March 1918. In the years that followed those who were in power in Belarus did their utmost to make Belarusians forget this event as well as the rest of their history. The consequences of this policy are felt today.

In 1991, with he collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus obtained its independence. However, the euphoria created by that event was short-lived. Now Belarus resembles not so much an independent country, but a reservation for aborigines of an almost extinct species known as Homo Sovieticus. It is governed by a regime of doubtful legitimacy and Belarusian only in name. Thus if Belarusians want to have any future as a nation, it is of utmost urgency for them to regain the sense of their history and national dignity. Those are the thoughts on the eve of marking the anniversary of the proclamation of Belarusian independence on 25 March 1918. Incidentally, just like in Soviet times, the commemoration of this date in the present-day “independent” Belarus is banned.

by Fr. Alexander Nadson
London, March 2000

Introduction

The purpose of this presentation is to refer to the particular experience of Belarus with regard to Communist crimes without statutory limitations, in order to set forth the arguments that underpin the Rada’s position on international measures to secure legal redress for such crimes, as well as its support for creating an appropriate judicial body in the EU.

After a brief historical background overview, I will firstly point out that it follows from the particular experience of Belarus that unblocking the way to legal settlement for Communist crimes without statutory limitations will require, as a prerequisite, securing redress also in relation to crimes committed although after the formal demise of Communism – but deriving directly from the Communist system and ideology. I will also mention how that affects the current EU member states. Secondly, the experience of Belarus does highlight the need for creating a robust international legal framework to attain justice with regard to Communist crimes, as well as Communist-derived crimes. Finally, I will announce a proposal from the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile for creating a norm of international law that would be instrumental for enabling international legal settlement for Communist crimes without statutory limitations.

Historical Background – Communist Crimes in Belarus

Waging a “revolutionary” war for Communist takeover in order to establish a world-wide Communist system was a core tenet and policy of Bolshevism when it took hold of Russia. Hence for such a government, the territory and resources of the country it controlled were only means for waging a war of aggression on its neighbours. In that sense, the Soviet Communist state a-priori resembled internationally a criminal enterprise rather than a proper state, and Belarus became one of its earliest victims.

A democratic Belarusian state was declared fully independent on the 25 March 1918 as the Belarusian Democratic Republic. Recognised by several other states but lacking support from the great powers of the age, in early 1919 it was overrun by Soviet Russia’s Red Army, its state institutions went into exile. Belarus was declared a Soviet republic, with the Red Terror fully unleashed. In 1921 it was then partitioned between Soviet Russia and Poland by the Treaty of Riga. A puppet Belarusian Soviet Socialist republic was re-established east of that border, incorporated into the USSR, and subjected to the full scale of early Soviet Bolshevik and later Stalinist terror. From 1929 on, the Communist “social cleansing” in Belarus was complemented by systematic persecution and destruction of its national educated class[1].

Special NKVD operations were also ordered from Moscow in Belarus in 1936-1937 targeting the Latvian, German and Polish ethnic minorities. After September 1939, the same fate was unleashed onto the Western areas of Belarus[2]. The repressions continued on a lesser scale after the Second World War. The overall number of peacetime victims[3], for which documentary references could be traced, is currently estimated around 700,000, i.e. about 10% of the population. A mass grave site near Minsk, Kurapaty, partially excavated in 1988, was estimated to have contained over 150,000 victims. Persecutions of dissidents, as well as policies of wiping out the country’s particular national identity (“denationalisation”[4]), continued in Belarus in various forms until late Perestroyka, as the Communist party there remained notoriously hard-line.

Lack of Justice for Communist Crimes at the National Level

Apart from a particular severity and length, the Communist crimes described above were largely a common experience of countries under Soviet domination. But unlike most others, neither a full vindication for the victims, nor bringing the perpetrators to justice, has become possible in Belarus at the national legal level so far.

In 1990-91 the Belarusian Popular Front’s pro-democracy minority in the last Soviet-era parliamentary assembly of Belarus achieved the adoption of several legal provisions, granting the cleared of charges (rehabilitation) status to the victims of “unfounded political repressions” for “counter-revolutionary crimes” since 1920, as well as political crimes up to 1988. However, this did not extend to those proven to have actually opposed or resisted the Soviet authorities, or found guilty of “treason” to the Soviet state. Those cleared of charges were estimated to amount to 60-65% of the victims. Following the restoration of Belarus’s independence, in 1992-93 they were offered small-scale state benefits such as discounts for medicines. In 1994 Belarus co-operated with Lithuania in the extradition of ex-Communist officials Burokevičius and Jermalavičius, later sentenced for involvement in the killing of 14 civilians in the Lithuanian capital in January 1991. But crucially, no legal acts were implemented in Belarus condemning Communism, establishing the past illegality of its rule in Belarus, condemning Communist crimes, or aimed at bringing to justice – or publically identifying – the perpetrators. It became evident in Belarus by mid-1990s that ignoring the past crimes politically, and leaving them without proper legal redress, had not laid any solid foundation for upholding reliable legality for the future. Moreover, that became a major factor paving the way in 1994 for the political revenge of the forces of Soviet continuity in Belarus.

Communist Continuity Crimes as an Obstacle for Justice for Communist Crimes

That early progress was halted and reversed when the regime of Alexander Lukashenka, professing its neo-Soviet ideology, established itself in Belarus between 1994 and 1996 as a dictatorship. As early as in 1995 the victims of Soviet political repressions were stripped of all benefits. The regime of Lukashenka not only restored the Soviet-like state symbols and reintroduced the Russian language as official, and returned the Soviet version of history in the system of education, but went on brutally to suppress its political opponents, effectively resuming political repressions against virtually all the former ideological opponents of Soviet Communism[5]. In some cases the succession has been institutional, as e.g. the KGB in Belarus did not even change its name. The Lenin All-Soviet Communist Youth Union in Belarus was preserved under an amended name, only to be restored under Lukashenka into the official youth organisation and put in charge of the neo-Soviet and pro-Lukashenka political indoctrination of the youth, and recently authorised to form paramilitary units in support of the state police forces.

Hence, all progress to legal settlement for Communist crimes in Belarus was blocked and reversed at the national level, as Lukashenka’s state authorities began to commit a series of new severe violations that have been Communist-derived or pertaining to Communist continuity in their motives and nature. This name appears appropriate here, as those acts of illegality in Belarus have been fundamentally motivated by the objectives of preserving and/or restoring elements of the Soviet Communist system, as well as protecting the political power – or social or economic assets – gained by particular individuals and groups as a direct result of (proceeds of) the earlier Communist rule and its crimes. Since 1995 in Belarus such crimes of Communist continuity by Alexander Lukashenka’s regime have been recorded to include imprisonments, arbitrary arrests, grievous bodily harm, forced hard labour, forced “disappearances” of several prominent political figures, confiscation of property, rigging of elections and usurpation and abuse of state authority, degrading treatment. Recently there have also been presented testimonies of widespread torture suffered by political prisoners[6].

Furthermore, the regime of Lukashenka in Belarus has been obstructing the course of justice internationally in relation to EU member states, by creating a safe haven for individuals from other parts of the former Soviet Union, sought by other countries in connection with Communist crimes, from the Stalinist era to 1991. Lukashenka’s officials refused to release documents on Polish PoW officers allegedly executed in Belarus in 1940 in parallel with the Katyn massacre (“the Belarusian List”) to Poland’s Katyn investigation. Lukashenka’s authorities refused to co-operate with Lithuanian investigators regarding the allegations against Rev. Juozas Bulka (died 2010) relating to a number of assassinations of members of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet underground in the early 1950s. Lukashenka’s regime also refused all extradition requests from the General Prosecutor’s Office of Lithuania for Uładzimir Uschopčyk (Vladimir Uskhopchik) and Stanislava Juonienė, on charges relating to the Soviet army killing of civilians in January 1991.

International Judicial Infrastructure to Include Communist-Continuity Crimes

Therefore, today the regime in Belarus stands as an international and domestic obstacle to attaining justice for Communist crimes, as well as a major current perpetrator of severe Communist-derived violations within the country. The existing international legal framework has been clearly inadequate for the arising problem. Recently there have been attempts to use the private prosecution tool against top members of Lukashenka’s regime travelling outside Belarus, but the national legal framework for that appears insufficient in many EU states[7].

Moreover, the unlawful nature of the regime’s current actions has not been adequately recognised or investigated in the EU framework. As a result, there have been insufficient legal safeguards against the proliferation of the regime’s repressive activities internationally. That has enabled Lukashenka’s authorities maliciously to exploit Belarus’s mutual legal assistance agreements to obtain sensitive information from Poland and Lithuania in order to imprison Aleś Bialacki, Belarus’s leading organiser of human rights activism, an former anti-Communist dissident since 1982. Mr Bialacki is in a prison camp now, and it is feasible to envisage that future legal settlement claims may arise from cases like that of Mr Bialacki, where persons or entities from within EU member states had provided – by intent or negligence – information enabling the regime in Belarus to carry out political repressions potentially leading to crimes against humanity (torture).

Conclusions and Proposals

Based on the particular experience in Belarus, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile points out, firstly, that the establishment of an EU-backed judicial body for the crimes of Communism without statutory limitations – thereby “internationalising” justice for Communist crimes – would make attaining justice by far more likely even in cases when that would all too likely fail at the national level, and/or when inter-state bilateral legal assistance procedures prove fruitless[8]. It would make it more difficult for those implicated to escape justice exploiting local legal circumstances or barriers between national judicial systems. Secondly, the experience of Belarus further highlights the need for extending the international framework for legal settlement also to include the Communist-derived type of crimes. Their perpetrators pursue the objectives of securing Communist continuity domestically and internationally, in order to continue to benefit from the proceeds of – and to obstruct the course of justice in relation to – the original Communist crimes.

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile will call upon any future democratic authority in Belarus to support the creation of an international judicial body for the crimes of Communism, and Communist-derived crimes, without statutory limitations.

We further suggest that, upon the establishment of that judicial body (whether EU-backed or not), the recognition of its jurisdiction should be made a binding condition for any state wishing to enter into an association agreement, to join the EU, or to enter into, upgrade or extend, other types of agreements with the EU.

Finally, the Rada of Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile proposes that a norm of international law should be created binding states not to withhold evidence pertaining to crimes against humanity.

Mikałaj Pačkajeŭ

Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile

5 June, 2012

European Parliament, Brussels

Endnotes

[1] As an example of Belarusian intelligentsia being exterminated with particular severity, while the Belarusian Union of Writers and other Belarusian PEN-type associations in 1930 counted about 700 members in Soviet Belarus, only 7 members were known to remain alive and free in 1939. Also, by 1939 not a single place of worship of any religion remained open anywhere in the Soviet-controlled Belarus.

[2] Prior to that in Poland as a result of the 1921 Riga Peace Treaty.

[3] This excludes the victims of e.g. Communist summary executions and other war crimes in Belarus, against PoWs and the population at large, during the Red Army’s offensive against the Belarusian Democratic Republic (winter 1919), Soviet-Polish war (1919-1920), the Red Army’s offensive against the Belarusian Democratic Republic’s authorities in Słucak District (November-December 1920), and the Second World War, as well as during Soviet anti-partisan operations in the 1920s and 1944-1950s.

[4] This term was coined for Belarus in English by David Marples in: Belarus: a Denationalised Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999.

[5] While these new repressions did not affect most churches, still e.g. the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox (in exile since 1944) remain suppressed in Belarus.

[6] A legal firm in London has been representing the victims and their relatives in that respect, as of May 2012.

[7] In January 2012 a case was filed in a court in Paris on behalf of a group of Belarusian prisoners’ relatives against the Interior Minister of Belarus, Anatoli Kulašoŭ (Anatoly Kuleshov) for “torture and cruel and degrading treatment”, but this did not result in measures to bring him before an inquiry:

http://www.rferl.org/content/french_torture_charge_against_belarus_minister/24457304.html

[8] Apart from the failed extraditions from Belarus, in July 2011 Lithuania was refused by Austria to extradite ex-KGB Colonel Mikhail Golovatov, a visiting Russian citizen, wanted for alleged involvement in the Soviet army killing of 14 civilians in the Lithuanian capital in January 1991.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the organizers of this event, dedicated to the European future of Belarus.

Blessed with an excellent geopolitical situation, at the crossroads of Europe, Belarus has not had a chance as yet to benefit from this advantage. On the contrary, it has made our country one of the most coveted, and thus vulnerable places in Europe. Innumerable wars have been fought by strangers on our land, our people have been decimated over and over again. And for a long time, we had no friends to defend our cause. We were the best kept secret in Europe.

The Soviet system has left our long suffering, Chernobyl stricken people, with one single concern – their physical survival. The instinct of survival has evolved in Belarus to a degree unknown to many nations. Thanks to their survival skills, the Belarusian people continue to exist, but are hesitant to assert themselves in the face of the challenges they endure in daily life, and the dangers they face under a government that violently discourages freedom of speech. This may be why the development of democratic values in Belarus, though present, seems at times stalled.

However, our young generations admire Western values and long to become part of this so much admired European family of nations. And Belarusian intelligentsia, who has always looked to the West, is ready to defend their European heritage. Historically, Belarus is much connected to Prague itself. I would like to mention Dr. Francisak   Skaryna, who printed the first Belarusian Bible in Prague, and returned to your lovely land to spend here the last years of his life. More recently, the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic has been active for 23 years in this hospitable city. And I would like to add our highly revered Vasil Bykau, with whom I spent our National Day one year ago here in Prague.

Dear Friends, it is on behalf of our youth and of our freedom fighters that I have come to ask – again – for your help. Every young Belarusian should have the possibility to study without being brainwashed, and without being forced to become a member of Lukashenka’s youth organization.

Freedom and democracy are concepts that are learned, nurtured and fostered. As such, they require exposure, free thinking, and the subsequent conviction to generate change. Every Belarusian should learn firsthand about the concept of freedom. Our young people need opportunities to study abroad, our decision makers need Western experience in the fields of economy, education, health and ecology, our freedom fighters need help to inform our people about such basic things as human rights…

The Lukashenka-driven and cultivated isolation of Belarus threatens to extinguish the hope for a different future. The members of the European Union will, perhaps unknowingly, contribute to this isolation by closing the borders between Belarus and the European Union.

The future of Belarus is not to be half way between Europe and Russia as some misled politicians think. It is not a no-mans land nor a consolation price in political negotiation. Belarus is a nation whose geography, history and identity define its place – and whose potential as a contributor to the future of Europe rests in the political decisions of our time.

If I were allowed to make one single request today – it would be to ask you to become participants in the defense of an old European nation by ensuring that Europe remains open to Belarus.

Ottawa, March 15, 2004

Ivonka Survilla
The President of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic