The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic,

Having considered numerous violations of democratic standards, such as the following:

– instances of disqualification of some opposition candidates, as well as the pressure exerted against others,

– lack of reasonable conditions for opposition candidates to conduct satisfactory electoral campaigns,

– effective lack of representation by the opposition in electoral commissions at all levels,

– complete lack of transparency during the vote-count, especially of votes cast in early voting,

– instances of pressure exerted on the voters, among them, forcing them to vote early ,

– instances of pressure on voting observers, including their removal from polling stations without justification,

– instances of rigging the voting procedure, such as multiple votes, and other violations,

Taking into account the failure by official authorities of the Republic of Belarus to comply with OSCE recommendations on improving of the election process in Belarus,

1. States that the elections to the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus were neither fair nor free, and that the resulting body cannot be regarded as a lawfully and democratically elected parliament of Belarus;

2. Draws attention to the fact that the elections were conducted with substantial violations of the electoral legislation of the Republic of Belarus currently in force, including its Constitution; as well as with violations of international accords signed by the Republic of Belarus;

3. Calls on the international community, including the European Union and the Council of Europe, to limit their contacts with the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus to technical issues only, thus excluding a possibility that said body would be officially recognized as a parliament of the Republic of Belarus, either formally or in practice;

4. Calls on the international community to apply pressure on the official authorities of Belarus with a view of bringing about democratization of Belarus’s political system and guaranteeing the protection of human rights that are called for in the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus;

5. Calls on the official authorities of the Republic of Belarus to release political prisoners, including Eduard Palčys, Michail Žamčužny, Uładzimir Kondruś to bring the political system of Belarus in line with international democratic standards, and to conduct free and transparent elections at all levels.

September 13, 2016

This article chronicles the history of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR) and its Council (Rada) from the time of its fleeing Red Army occupiers in 1920 until the present day. It discusses the Belarusian experience in comparison to those of other exiled governments, particularly that of Ukraine. Finally, it suggests that Western governments should both take cognizance of this historical democratic tradition and give the present Rada appropriate policy attention in considering relations with post-Soviet Belarus.

Most of the countries of east central Europe benefited from the surge of democratic idealism which flowed from World War I, as expounded most ardently, perhaps, by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Poland broke free from the yoke of nearly 150 years of great power partition. Czechoslovakia emerged from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the most stunningly successful democracy of the interwar period in the region. Hungary achieved independent status as did the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The striving for democracy, too, touched the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples. Both achieved independence and democratic governance, albeit for much shorter periods of time than the above-mentioned countries mainly due to their closer proximity to Bolshevist Russia. Regrettably, these efforts at national self-determination-particularly in the case of Belarus-were largely ignored by the Western powers.

The democratic experience in this region came to a screeching halt through a combination of sovietization and World War II. Democratically elected governments went into exile. The better known cause by which these governments fled their homelands-and the one which led the West to recognize such governments-was Hitler’s invasion of East Central Europe.

Perhaps most illustrative of this “model” was the Polish experience. With the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the Polish government evacuated to various locales in the south and east, eventually seeking refuge in Romania. Later, the Polish government-in-exile established itself in England, where it remained until the end of the war. As chronicled in The History of Poland Since 1863, edited by R. F. Leslie, Western support for this government waned rapidly at the end of the war as Churchill and Roosevelt sought to reach agreements with Stalin over future arrangements in Poland and elsewhere. The book’s assertion, however, that the government-in-exile ” . . . was never again to play a part in Polish affairs” (p. 279) is incorrect. In fact, the government continued in existence until December 1990 when the leadership transferred its authority to President Lech Walesa during his inauguration.

Other victims of the German invasion and/or the cynical division of the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, which preceded Hitler’s invasion of the USSR itself, also established governments in exile. The Baltic states were notable in this regard. All three were recognized by many Western governments; in the case of the United States this recognition allowed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to maintain diplomatic representations in Washington throughout the postwar Soviet period. Convoluted rules for contacts by U.S. diplomats in those Soviet “republics” kept alive the unique status of these countries until they were able to resume their independent, democratic courses with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The lesser known “model” by which governments in the region went into exile is much older. It applies only to Ukraine and Belarus. As World War I was drawing down, movements for national self-determination developed among both peoples. In the Ukrainian case-as documented and analyzed carefully by Professor D. Doroshenko in his 1939 book, History of the Ukraine -the essence of a highly complex set of factors is that a pluralistically founded Ukrainian Democratic Republic was established in the late 1917, proclaiming full Ukrainian independence from Russia. With various mutations and boundary alterations, the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and its government continued to exist until autumn 1920. Then, with the Polish-Soviet conflict ending via the eventual Treaty of Riga (ratified in 1921), the Red Army was able to focus on the Ukrainians, who were eventually routed and forced to flee into Polish territory. From that point the Ukrainian Democratic Republic existed in exile.

Although the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been recognized by a number of countries (perhaps as many as twenty, some establishing diplomatic or consular representations in Kiev), when its government went into exile it received little or no international support or recognition. The government continued to exist, however, eventually transforming itself into the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. With the collapse of the USSR and establishment of an independent Ukraine, spirited discussions took place among Ukrainian emigres as to the desirability of terminating the government-in-exile and returning its authorities to the newly independent government in Kiev. Despite the view of many that it was too soon to judge the sincerity of the new government, plus the fact that the existing parliament had been elected during the Soviet period, the majority favored returning the exiled government to the homeland. Thus, the last Ukrainian president-in-exile, Mikola Plaviuk, a Canadian citizen, returned the authority of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic to the government of Leonid Kravchuk in 1992. Plaviuk himself resumed residence in Ukraine, where he lives today.

This brings us to the Belarusian case, by far the least known or understood of all the instances in which democratically based governments in East Central Europe were forced into exile. As noted above, like Ukraine, Belarus’ democrats pursued and achieved independence in the maelstrom of events surrounding the close of World War I, the rise of Bolshevism, and the aura of Wilsonian democratic idealism which quickly permeated into the mentalities of long-repressed peoples of the region.

As documented by Professor Jan Zaprudnik in his book Belarus at a Crossroads in History (p. 67 and following), beginning in March 1917 various Belarusian parties and organizations convened to foster statehood for Belarus. Following the failure of the Bolsheviks in November 1917 to include autonomy for Belarus in their program, according to Prof. Zaprudnik the next month a coalition of Belarusian organizations and parties convened the All-Belarusian Congress in Miensk. The Congress, he notes, proclaimed Belarus a democratic republic. “On the following day, the delegates handed over their power to the Rada of the Congress, whose executive committee continued to lead the national movement from underground.” (Zaprudnik, p. 67). Inter alia, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918, ending World War I, divided Belarus among neighboring states. This caused the Executive Committee, in its Third Constituent Charter issued March 25, 1918, to proclaim the Belarusian Democratic Republic as an independent and free state. (Zaprudnik, p. 68-70)

Thus was a broadly based, democratic Belarusian state created. From March though December of 1918, the new government in Miensk organized itself, establishing an administration and creating its own military units. The government also began an active diplomatic initiative to seek recognition in the world community. Unfortunately, this latter was not successful. Belarus’ geographic location between Russia and Poland-and long historical occupation by one or the other, or both-led few countries to recognize the new state and its government. Among those who did, however, were Germany, Turkey, and Ukraine. The United States did not.

The Polish-Soviet War alluded to above also had adverse consequences for the fragile new country of Belarus. With the cessation of hostilities in the autumn of 1920, Poland and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic agreed on the redivision of Belarus more or less coincident with Poland’s pre-partition eastern boundary. The new Belarus army fought bravely but futilely to forestall this fate, particularly at a major engagement in the Sxuck region in the fall of 1920. Western Belarus reverted to Poland, and the Soviets created a new Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, with its capital at Smolensk.

Starting in late 1919, the core of the Belarusian Democratic Republic’s Executive Council (BNR Rada) emigrated, seeking political exile abroad. As with the Ukrainians, these Belarusian democrats found refuge in newly independent (and strongly democratic) Czechoslovakia. Belarus’ first president, Piotra Kreceuski, and his deputy, Vasil Zacharka, took up residence in Prague, where the main body of the BNR Rada was eventually established. (One BNR faction remained behind in the now-divided country but ceased to function as an organized political group.)

The Prague group, under Kreceuski’s leadership, was active politically, developing a wide political agenda. Interestingly, the Rada at that time sent a BNR emissary to the United States, Mr. Jazep Varonka, who had been Prime Minister of the 1919-20 BNR government in Belarus itself. (Reportedly, the U.S. government told Varonka that it could not grant the BNR recognition since the “official government” of Belarus was in Miensk, i.e., under Soviet control.)

Beginning in 1924, the Bolsheviks sought to weaken (and eventually eliminate) the Prague group, ostensibly seeking rapprochement by sending emissaries on several visits to the Rada-in-exile. The Soviets apparently felt the BNR continued to have emotional and national importance, thus requiring its elimination. This effort culminated in October 1925 with a conference in Berlin, at which several Rada members renounced their affiliation with the BNR and returned to their homeland. The Rada, headed by Krece`ski, nonetheless continued to function in Prague.

From 1925 through 1939, the BNR Rada in Prague was the sole political representation of Belarusian statehood abroad. Mr. Kreceuski died in 1928; his deputy, Mr. Zacharka, was elected head of the Rada. In 1939 and 1940, the Nazis approached Zacharka with a view to seeking the Rada’s collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union. Zacharka refused.

During the war, the BNR Rada was obviously inactive, but with the war over, and having moved to Paris, the BNR leadership reactivated itself. Mikola Abramcyk succeeded Mr. Zacharka (who had died in 1943) as President (starssynia) of the Rada. Abramcyk, in particular, devoted great efforts to visiting and assisting Belarusian refugees in Germany and elsewhere. He had extensive political contacts with Washington, Paris, and other capitals and took an active part in a non-Russian emigre organization, the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, also known as the Paris Bloc. The Bloc, of which he was president, included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, North Caucasus and Ukraine.

In the meantime, activists in German-occupied Belarus had established a “Belarusian Central Rada”, headed by Radaslau Astrouski, shortly before the end of World War II. This group was strongly anticommunist in nature, and many of its members successfully emigrated abroad as the Germans fell back from occupied territories. While significant remnants of this Rada are still active in the Belarusian diaspora, many have associated themselves with the BNR Rada.

The BNR Rada has functioned continuously since 1948 (and indeed since 1919 except for the hiatus caused by World War II). From the spring of 1946 through 1988, nineteen sessions of the Rada took place, reviewing activities of the BNR and adopting future policies and programs. As presently constituted, the Rada has over 50 members, including a President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Foreign Relations Liaison. Dr. Barys Ragula, a Canadian citizen and prominent physician, is currently Acting President of the Rada, succeeding Dr. Jazep Sazyc.

As with the BNR Rada, the governments-in-exile of other East Central European countries represented both legitimacy and democracy for their countries and countrymen during periods when other types of regimes were imposed by force. In cases where democratically based governments were forced out by Hitler’s Germany, the United States and other Western countries typically recognized those governments-in-exile until such time as conditions permitted the return to democratic governance. Regrettably, that was not the case with regard to democratically inclined governments based on national self-determination in Belarus and Ukraine.

The fact remains, however, that the BNR Rada provides the one unbroken, continuous link of democratic pluralism between Belarus’ one and only period of nation-state existence (1918-1920) and the restoration of independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Unlike its Ukrainian analog, the BNR Rada chose to withhold recognition and return of authority to the new leadership in Belarus. It did so because the legislature was of the Soviet period, i e. not democratically elected, and because of skepticism over the course of democratic reform in the executive branch of government.

With the benefit of hindsight, this decision would appear to have been quite prescient. The Western world is unanimous in its view that the current state of governance in Belarus is neither democratic nor reached democratically. Therefore, the chalice of Belarusian democratic tradition and national legitimacy should naturally continue to reside with the Belarusian diaspora.

But what are the implications of this for Western governments? There are at least two. First, it is important for the West to take cognizance of and give recognition to historical facts. In this case that means a government-in-exile that was created democratically, forced out of its homeland by a physically more powerful but morally corrupt regime, and has maintained a continuous democratic tradition up to the present time.

Secondly, the West should welcome formal contacts at all levels with the BNR Rada. This is needed to assure that governmental decisions concerning Belarusian affairs to the greatest extent possible incorporate the policy desiderata of those with whom resides the legacy of the one historical expression of Belarus’ national self-determination. To do otherwise would be unfair to Belarusians themselves-both those who reside within the country and those in diaspora.

by David H. Swartz, U.S. Ambassador to Belarus from 1992 to 1994.

Spring 1997 issue, vol. 9, no. 1, of the Belarusian Review.
Posted by permission of Belarusian Review. © Copyright Belarusian Review.

First Constituent Charter

To the people of Belarus

Our native land has found itself in a new and difficult situation. The fate of the regime that was here previously is not known. We face the possible occupation of our land by German troops.

We must take our fate into our own hands. The Belarusan people must assert their right to full self-determination, and the national minorities their right to national and personal autonomy.

The rights of nation should find realization by means of a Constituent Assembly convened on democratic principles.

However, even before convening the Constituent Assembly, all power in Belarus should belong to the peoples residing therein.

The Executive Committee of the Council (Rada) of the First All Belarusan Congress, supplemented by representatives of the revolutionary democracy of the national minorities and fulfilling the goals imposed upon it by the Congress, declares itself to be the Provisional Authority in Belarus to govern the land and to convene as soon as possible an All-Belarusan Constituent Assembly based on universal voting rights for the entire adult population without distinction of nationality, religion, or sex.

The Provisional National Authority in the land, having assumed the tasks of defending and strengthening the revolutionary achievements, will carry out these tasks through the National Secretariat of Belarus, which has been established and which, from this date on, has assumed the exercise of its responsibilities. The names of the members of the Secretariat will be published later.

The Executive Committee of the Council of the First All-Belarusan Congress
Given in Miensk, Belarus, February 21 (8), 1918.

Second Constituent Charter

To the people of Belarus

During this World War in which some powerful states have been destroyed and others liberated, Belarus has awakened to national life. After three and a half centuries of subjugation, the Belarusan nation again declares to the entire world that it is alive and will remain alive. The Great National Assembly the All-Belarusan Congress of December 5-17, 1917, concerned about the fate of Belarus, confirmed a republican government within its territory. Carrying out the will of the Congress and defending the national rights of the people, the Executive Committee of the Council (Rada) of the Congress, decrees the following concerning the political structure of Belarus and the rights and freedoms of her citizens and peoples:

1. Belarus, within the borders of the numerical majority of the Belarusan people, is declared to be a Democratic Republic.
2. The fundamental laws of the Belarusan Democratic Republic will be confirmed by the Constituent Assembly of Belarus, convened on the principles of a universal, equal, direct, secret, and proportional voting law without regard to sex, nationality, or religion.
3. Until such time as the Constituent Assembly of Belarus convenes, the legislative authority in the Belarusan Deratic Republic shall belong to the Council of the All-Belarusan Congress, augmented by representatives of the national minorities of Belarus.
4. The executive and administrative authority in the Belarusan Democratic Republic shall belong to the National Secretariat of Belarus which shall be appointed by the Council of the Congress and be responsible thereto.
5. Within the borders of the Belarusan Democratic Republic freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the right to strike and organize unions are proclaimed; as well as unconditional freedom of conscience, and the inviolability of the individual and of residence.
6. Within the borders of the Belarusan Democratic Republic all peoples have the right to national and personal autonomy; and equal rights for all the languages of the peoples of Belarus are proclaimed.
7. Within the borders of the Belarusan Democratic Republic the right to private ownership of land is abolished. The land is to be given over without payment to those who till it. Forests, lakes, and natural resources are declared to be the property of the Belarusan Democratic Republic.
8. Within the borders of the Belarusan Democratic Republic a working day of a maximum of eight hours is established.

Proclaiming all these rights and freedoms for the citizens and peoples of the Belarusan Democratic Republic, we, the Executive Committee of the Council of the Congress pledge to guard the legal order of life in the Republic, ensure the interests of all the citizens and peoples of the Republic, and preserve the rights and freedoms of the working people. We shall also apply all oui, strength to convene the Constituent Assembly of Byelorussia in the very near future.

We call on all faithful sons of the Belarusan land to assist us in our difficult and responsible labors.

The Executive Committee of the Council of the First All-Belarusan Congress
Given in Miensk, Belarus, March 9, 1918.

Third Constituent Charter

A year ago the peoples of Belarus, together with the peoples of Russia, threw off the yoke of Russian tsarism, which had oppressed Belarus most of all and, without asking the people, precipitated our land into the conflagration of war which totally destroyed Belarusan cities and villages.

Now we, the Council (Rada) of the Belarusan Democratic Republic, have’cast off from our native land the last vestige of national dependence which the Russian tsars imposed by force upon our free and independent land.

From this time on, the Belarusan Democratic Republic is proclaimed an independent and free state. The peoples of Belarus themselves, under the aegis of their Constituent Assembly, shall determine the future national relations of Belarus.

By virtue of this, all former national relations lose their force relations which made it possible for a foreign government to sign the Treaty of Brest for Belarus, thus destroying the Belarusan people by partitioning their land.

By virtue of this, the government of the Belarusan Democratic Republic will establish relations with interested parties by proposing to them a review of that part of the Treaty ol Brest which concerns Belarus and the signing of peace treaties with all belligerent states.

The Belarusan Democratic Republic should include all those lands where the Belarusan people constitute a numerical majority, namely: the Mahileu region, the Belarusan parts of the regions of Miensk, Horadnia (including the cities of Horadnia, Bielastok, and others), Vilnia, Viciebsk, Smalensk, and Charnihau, as well adjacent parts of neighboring gubernias, inhabited by Belarusans.

The Belarusan Democratic Republic confirms all those rights and freedoms of the citizens and peoples of Belarus which were proclaimed by the Constituent Charter of March 9, 1918.

Proclaiming the independence of the Belarusan Democratic Republic, its Council expresses the hope that all freedom-loving peoples will assist the Belarusan people to achieve fully their political and national ideals.

The Council (Rada) of the Belarusan Democratic Republic
Given in Miensk, Belarus, on March 25, 1918.

“…We, the Council (Rada) of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, have cast off from our native land the last vestige of national dependence which the Russian tsars imposed by force upon our free and independent land. From this time on, the Belarusian Democratic Republic is proclaimed and independent and free state.”

Those are the words from the Declaration Independence made by the Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Minsk on 25 March 1918. The independence did not last long owing to unfavourable political situation. All the same, from that day on Belarusians all over the world keep the 25 March as their Independence Day.

Belarus became part of the Russian Empire as a result of partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772-95. The tsarist authorities regarded it simply as the North-Western province (Severo-zapadnyi krai) of Russia, inhabited by people speaking a kind of peasant Russian dialect. Consequently all signs of individuality were systematically eradicated, including the destruction of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church to which the majority of Belarusians belonged. The opposite view was held by Poles, or rather by polonised Belarusian landed gentry, for whom Belarus was a Polish province. Despite this, Belarusian national movement began to manifest itself early in the 19th century, and gathered momentum especially after emancipation of peasants in 1861.

In 1862 the revolutionary leader Kastus Kalinouski (hanged by Russians in 1864) began publishing clandestine paper Muzhytskaia prauda (Peasant truth). Some twenty years later the Belarusian group of the movement Narodnaia volia (People’s freedom) in their underground paper Homon was already raising the question of Belarusian autonomy. The end of the 19th century saw also the appearance of new Belarusian writers and poets, the most prominent of whom was Frantsishak Bahushevich (1840-1900) who reminded the Belarusians: “Do not abandon our Belarusian tongue that we may not die”. But it was not until 1903 that the first Belarusian party, the Belaruskaia Revaliutsyinaia Hramada (Belarusian Revolutionary Party) was founded. Two years later, under its definitive name of Belaruskaia sacyialistychnaia hramada (Belarusian Socialist Party) it played an active role in the revolution of 1905-1907.

In the years that followed members of the Hramada were closely connected with the newspaper Nasha niva (Our field) which, until its closure in 1915 was the focal point of Belarusian political and cultural life. The Hramada was the only Belarusian political party during that period. Other parties then active in the area – Russian, Polish, Jewish, – were, with few exceptions, indifferent or even openly hostile to Belarusian national aspirations.

One year after the outbreak of the First World War, in summer 1915, Belarus was divided by the frontline between German and Russian armies. The hardships caused by the war were aggravated by the refugee problem: before abandoning Western Belarus to the Germans, the Russian authorities evacuated over a million of its inhabitants who were taken inside Russia and largely left to their own fate. This was the situation in Belarus at the time of the February Revolution of 1917. From then on the events began to move rapidly.

The Provisional Russian government of Kerenski was replaced in November 1917 by a Communist one who, in their turn, in February 1918, abandoned the area to the Germans. In December of the same year the Germans retreated, and Communist Soviet rule was established again in Belarus with the exception of the Hrodna region in the West. During the late spring and early summer of 1919 Belarus was invaded by Poles who remained there until summer 1920.

Against this background of ever-changing political scene the Belarusians tried to establish their own independent state. Their efforts led to the convocation in December 1917 in Minsk of the All-Belarusian Congress and, finally the proclamation on 25 March 1918 of the independent Belarusian Democratic Republic (Belaruskaia Narodnaia Respublika, abbreviated as BNR). The odds were, however, against them. In December the Council and Government of the BNR left Minsk and established themselves in Hrodna which at that time was the centre of a semi-autonomous Belarusian region within the Lithuanian Republic. The Polish invasion in spring of 1919 put an end to this, and the government of the BNR went into exile. The hopes of some of its members that the Poles would help in re-establishing Belarusian independence were soon dispelled.

In the meantime the Soviet authorities who, like the Russian Provisional Government before them, were hostile to the idea of Belarusian independence, began to take notice of the strong national feelings among Belarusians and of the pressure exerted by various Belarusian refugee organisations inside Russia. On 1 January 1919 the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (abbreviated as BSSR; initially it was called Soviet Socialist Republic of Belarus or SSRB) was proclaimed. The new “state” did not exist long as a separate entity: In February of the same year it became part of a new creation called the Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As the hopes of establishing Soviet rule in Lithuania receded, the idea of the latter was abandoned, and in summer 1920 the BSSR was restored in its pristine form. Territorially, however, the Republic comprised only a tiny part of Eastern Belarus (six counties of the Minsk province), while the Western part remained under Polish domination. This partition of Belarus was finally ratified in 1921 by the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Riga, and lasted until 1939.

The foregoing account may give an idea of the complexity of the problem faced by the student of Belarusian history during the first two decades of the 20th century. His task is not made easier by the absence of reliable bibliographical guide. What follows is not intended to be such a guide, but merely a description of relevant material available in the Francis Skaryna Belarusian Library in London.

Among the few bibliographical works there is A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia by N. Vakar (Harvard U.P. 1956). Its section on the period in question (Nos 1022-1160 and 1384-1590 is useful at least as a beginning. Another work, Bibliahrafiia pa historyi Belarusi by M. Krakene and A. Sakol’chyk (Minsk 1969), contains a large section (Nos 3782-4453) on the period from 1900 to the February 1917. Only works in Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian are listed, and by no means not all of them. Works of authors such as U. Ihnatouski, A. Stankievich, A. Lutskievich, A. Tsvikievich, J. Naidziuk and others have been omitted.

To understand the events of 1900-1921 a knowledge of preceding period at least from 1861 is useful. An account of the whole period 1861-1921 in vols. 2 and 3 of the five-volume “academic” Historyia Belaruskai SSR (Minsk 1971-75) represents the official Soviet point of view, and suffers from the usual defects of works of this kind, namely partiality and omission of inconvenient facts. The new “academic” work, Narysy pa historyi Belarusi, ed. Kastsiuk et al. (2 vols., Minsk 1994-95), is an attempt at a more balanced view of history. The other general works on Belarus history, including chapters on the period in question, are Belarus uchora i siannia by J. Naidziuk (Minsk 1943; 2nd ed. Minsk 1993); Weissruthenien: Volk und Land by E. von Engelhardt (Berlin 1943); and Belorussia: the Making of the Nation by N. Vakar (Harvard U.P. 1957), the latter being written in a somewhat patronising tone. The latest addition is J. Zaprudnik’s Belarus at the crossroads of History (Boulder-Oxford 1993; Belarusian edition Minsk 1996). Historyia Belarusi XIX i pachatku XX staletstsia by U. Ihnatouski (Minsk 1926) deals with the period of Belarusian history from the beginning of the 19th century to 1921. Da historyi belaruskaha palitychnaha vyzvalennia by A. Stankevich (Vilna 1934) is an interesting study of the Belarusian national movement between the years 1862-1921. Another work, covering roughly the same period, but concentrating particularly on the years 1905-1920, is Belorusskoe dvizhenie by F. Turuk (Moscow 1921; reprint Minsk 1992). It is a comprehensive and factual study of the period in question, written with rare objectivity and supported by the mass of documentary evidence. Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Belorussii (1863-1917) by S. Agurski (Minsk 1928) is also well documented. Unlike Turuk, however, its author is mainly concerned with non-Belarusian parties, especially RSDRP (as the Communist party was then called).

Byelorussian Statehood, ed. V. & Z. Kipel (New York 1988) is a source book on the Belarusian history of 1917-21, containing writings of persons who were directly involved in the events of 1917-1921, such us Krecheuski, Varonka, Zakharka etc., articles by historians J. Zaprudnik, P. Urban and J. Menski, biographical notes on over 60 Belarusian leaders of the period, bibliography and chronological table of events. It is a must for everyone interested in the history of Belarusian struggle for national independence.

There is a scarcity of published documents on the period in question. The bulky vols. 3 and 4 of Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Belorussii (Minsk 1953 & 1954), contain documents of 1900-1917 and 1917-1919 resp., all in Russian, and one would in vain look in them for any mention of Belarus, let alone BNR. As far as Belarusian documents are concerned, apart from the above mentioned book by Turuk (39 documents), one should mention Kryvavy shliakh belaruskai natsdemokratyi by A. Ziuzkou (Minsk 1932). The author, hostile to Belarusian national movement, in an appendix gives texts of 31 documents of 1917-21.

Another major collection (58 documents) is found in Za dziarzhaunuiu nezalezhnasts Belarusi, ed. I. Kasiak (London 1960). A truly monumental work is Arkhivy Belaruskai Narodnai Respubliki, ed. S.Shupa (2 books, Vilna-New York 1998), containing over 3000 documents of the BNR from the Lithuanian State Archives.

Among the works on the period 1900-1917 there is first of all Za dvatstsats piats hadou by A. Lutskevich (Vilna 1928; 2nd ed. Minsk 1991, with postscript by A. Sidarevich). The author, one of the pioneers of the Belarusian national movement, traces the history of the first Belarusian political party, the Belaruskaia Satsyialistychnaia Hramada, and remembers the persons and events connected with it. The chapter “Belaruskaie natsyianalnaie adradzhennie (1902-1915)” in the book Z historyi Belarusi by J. Stankievich (Munich 1958) contains much interesting material on the Belarusian national movement, in which the author took active part. An assessment of the role played by the Communists in Belarusian movement is found in Bol’shevizm v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii Belorussii by N. Nedasek (Munich 1956). An important aspect of the Belarusian national activities before 1917 is considered in J. Zaprudnik’s doctoral thesis Political struggle for Byelorussia in the Tsarist State Dumas 1906-1917 (Typescript, New York 1966) and a number of his articles on the same subject, such as “The struggle for Byelorussia’s Autonomy in the First State Duma” (The Journal of Byelorussian Studies, Vol.II, No.3, London 1971), and “Byelorussia’s Representatives in the Second State Duma” (Ibid., Vol.III, No.3, 1975). The development of Belarusian press, and in particular the newspaper Nasha niva, is the subject of the book Putsiaviny rodnaha slova by S. Aleksandrovich (Minsk 1971), and the article “Nasha niva” by the present writer (The Journal of Byelorussian Studies, Vol. I, No.3, 1967). Incidentally the sets of papers Nasha dolia (1906), and Nasha niva for the years (1906-1909) are now available in facsimile editions. Belaruski litaraturna-hramadski rukh u Petsiarburze by R. Semashkevich (Minsk 1971) is a study of the Belarusian colony (mainly students) in St Petersburg and their role in the Belarusian national movement.

There are several eyewitness accounts of the events from February 1917 to 1921. E. Kancher, his Belorusskii vopros (Petrograd 1919) left one of the first written accounts of the All-Belarusian Congress of December 1917 and the events leading to the proclamation of independence on 25 March 1918, of which he was not in favour. J. Varonka, the first prime minister of BNR, gave his version of events in Belaruski rukh ad 1917 da 1920 hodu (Kaunas 1920).

Other contemporary publications are Korotkii ocherk vozniknoveniia Belorusskoi Narodnoi Respubliki by A. Tsvikevich (Kiev 1918), and Uskhodniaia Belarus by A.I. (Minsk 1918), the latter giving a detailed picture of the growth of Belarusian movement leading to the declaration independence. There is also the first and only issue of the journal Varta (Minsk 1918), a semi-official organ of the Belarusian Government. P. Krecheuski, a member of the first Belarusian government and later President of the Council (Rada) of the BNR writes about the events of 1917-18 in his article “Belarus u minulym i suchasnym” in the first (and only) issue of the journal Zamiezhnaia Belarus (Prague 1926).

“Da Piershaha Usiebelaruskaha Ziezdu 1917” ed. I. Zaprudnik (Zapisy, Munich, No.2,1963; No.3, 1964; No. 4, 1966) is a useful collection of materials and documents on the All-Belarusian Congress, compiled from publications, not easily accessible today .

Attempts to form Belarusian army are described in various articles, such as “Belaruskiia vaiskovyia farmatsyi na Rumynskim frontsie” by S.K. (the journal Kryvich, No.1, Kaunas 1923), “Belaruskaia Vaiskovaia Tsentralnaia Rada” by K. Iezavitau (Ibid., No.7, 1924, No.9, 1925); “Histarychny kalendar belaruskikh addzielau litouskaha voiska” by A. Sam. (Krynitsa, Vilna, No.4, 1939; Nos 7, 16, 27, 40, 1940); “Piershy belaruski polk u Horadni i iak paliaki razbroili iaho” by A. Uspienski (Ranitsa, Berlin, No.44, 1943, et seq); “25 Uhodki Horadzienskaie Hubernskaie Upravy” by V.B. (ibid. No.49-50, 1943; 1-2, 1944). The only issue of Na chuzhynie (Riga 1920), organ of gen. S. Buklakh-Balakhovich and his “private army”, is of interest for the study of this controversial figure who caused BNR more embarrassment than help. Bialoruskie formacje wojskowe 1917-1923 by O. Latyszonek (Bialystok 1995) is the first comprehensive study of Belarusian military units. Another recent publication is “Polskaia palityka na Bielarusi u chasie Polska-Balshavitskaie vainy 1919-1920 h.” by F. Kushal in his Sproby stvarennia belaruskaha voiska (Minsk 1999).

Very little was written about BNR by Soviet historians, and almost invariably in a negative manner. The book by Ziuzkou (see above) is a good example. Among the more recent publications there are Niepazbiezhnaie bankrutstva by M. Stashkievich (Minsk 1974), and also his and I. Kovkel’s Pochemu ne sostoialas BNR (Minsk1980), with its English version Why was the BNR never formed (Minsk 1983). On the other hand there is great number of works on the establishment of the Belarusian Soviet Republic, practically all suffering of the same defect, namely one-sidedness and suppression of inconvenient facts. Such are Utvarennie Belaruskai Sacyialistychnai Respubliki (Minsk 1946) and Belorusskii narod v bor’be za sovetskuiu vlast’ (Minsk 1963) by N. Kamenskaia; Sozdanie i uprochnenie belorusskoi gosudarstvennosti by S. Margunskii (Minsk 1958); Pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Belorussii, ed. I. Mints (Minsk 1967). More serious, although still in the same spirit is Rozhdenie Belorusskoi Sovetskoi Respubliki by V. Krutalevich (Minsk 1975). His most recent work, Stanovlenie natsional’noi derzhavnosti (Minsk 1999), written in somewhat different circumstances, contains a wealth of concrete material. Among works by non-Soviet writers one should mention Bol’shevizm na putiakh k ustanovleniiu kontrolia nad Belorussiu by N. Nedasek (Munich 1954), and his “National self-determination under the Soviets” (Belorussian Review, No.8, Munich 1960), as well as “The Establishment of the Belorussian SSR” by J. Menski (ibid, No.1, 1955).

Belarusian-Polish relations, and in particular the Polish occupation of 1919-1920, are dealt with in Adradzhennie Belarusi i Polshcha by A. Tsvikievich (Berlin 1921); Belorussy i poliaki by K. Iezavitau (Kaunas 1919); Belorusskii vopros k momentu Versal’skoi Mirnoi Konferentsii by I. Varonka (Kaunas 1919); Polskaia akupatsyia Belarusi by A. Lutskievich (Vilna 1920); Uspaminy ab polskai akupatsyi Hrodzienshchyny by I. Antonau (n.p. 1921); and in the clandestine journal Sielanskaia dolia (n.p. 1921-22). The Polish position with regard to Belarus is stated in Les confins orientaux de la Pologne (Paris 1919), an official publication for the Versailles Conference. Other works include Zywiol polski na ziemiach litewskich by M. Swiechowski (Zakopane 1917), Polska a Litwa i Bialorus by J. Sorokowicz (Warsaw 1919); Panstwo polskie a kwestia bialoruska by Szczesny Bronowski (Warsaw 1919); Litwa i Bialorus by L. Wasilewski (Warsaw 1925); Sprawa bialoruska by S. Elski (Warsaw 1931); Federaliam. Litwa i Bialorus w polityce obozu Belwederskiego (XI 1918 – IV 1920) by J. Lewandowski (Warsaw 1962); Polityka wschodnia Polski wobec ziem Litwy, Bialorusi i Ukrainy (1918-1919) by A. Deruga (Warsaw 1969) and others.

The position of Belarusian Catholics and their role in the Belarusian national life have been studied by A. Stankievich in his Rodnaia mova u sviatyniakh (Vilna 1929) and Bielaruski khrystsiianski rukh (Vilna 1939). K. Svaiak (Fr. K. Stepovich) in his diary Dzieia maioi mysli, serca i voli (Vilna 1932; 2nd ed. London 1991), draws the picture of difficulties encountered by a Belarusian Catholic priest in his pastoral work. An interesting work, dealing to great extent with this subject is Stosunek Biskupa Jerzego Matulewicza do spraw jezykowych w Diecezji Wilenskiej, 1918-1925, by T. Gorski (Warsaw 1970). No similar work exists with regard to the Orthodox Church, but some information may be found in the book Belarus by Archbp Afanasi (Buenos Aires 1966; 2nd ed. Minsk 1990).

Much useful information can be found in the contemporary papers, namely Homan (Vilna 1916-1918), Bielaruskae zhytstsio (Vilna 1919); Belarus (Minsk 1919-1920).
There are incomplete sets of these publications in the F. Skaryna Library. Starting with 1989 many interesting and valuable articles and hitherto inaccessible materials have appeared in journals Polymia, Neman, Belaruski histarychny chasopis and especially Spadchyna, all published in Minsk.

The foregoing description does not pretend to be a complete bibliography, but it is hoped that it shows the wealth of material on the struggle of Belarusians for their national identity early in the 20th century, and the proclamation independence on 25 March 1918. In the years that followed those who were in power in Belarus did their utmost to make Belarusians forget this event as well as the rest of their history. The consequences of this policy are felt today.

In 1991, with he collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus obtained its independence. However, the euphoria created by that event was short-lived. Now Belarus resembles not so much an independent country, but a reservation for aborigines of an almost extinct species known as Homo Sovieticus. It is governed by a regime of doubtful legitimacy and Belarusian only in name. Thus if Belarusians want to have any future as a nation, it is of utmost urgency for them to regain the sense of their history and national dignity. Those are the thoughts on the eve of marking the anniversary of the proclamation of Belarusian independence on 25 March 1918. Incidentally, just like in Soviet times, the commemoration of this date in the present-day “independent” Belarus is banned.

by Fr. Alexander Nadson
London, March 2000

On the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear accident

Thirty years ago Belarus faced the most severe industrial and environmental disaster in its history. As a result of an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, large amount of radioactive material was thrown into the atmosphere, up to 70% of which fell onto the territory of Belarus.

The BNR Rada states that Belarus has suffered more than any other country from the Chernobyl catastrophe, and that the accident’s effects will be felt in Belarus for many centuries. A third of Belarus’s territory has been contaminated by the radioactive fallout; large areas became unsuitable for human habitation. Belarus has seen a sharp rise in deceases caused by the Chernobyl disaster – above all, cancer.

The BNR Rada declares that the totalitarian Communist regime – both the central government in Moscow and the local Soviet occupation authorities in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic – bears the full responsibility for the Chernobyl catastrophe and its effects on Belarus:

– The Chernobyl accident itself was a result of the flawed Soviet economic management, faulty Soviet technologies, and errors made at the design and construction stages of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant;

– Following the accident and up until the point when the radioactive fallout reached Western Europe the Communist authorities tried to conceal or understate the scale of the catastrophe;

– The Communist high officials’ behaviour during the first, most critical, days after the accident amounted to criminal inaction, as they were holding mass outdoor public events instead of warning the population to take necessary protective precautions;

– According to the information available today the Soviet air force deliberately condensed clouds containing radioactive particles over the areas of eastern and south-eastern Belarus, in order to prevent the radioactivity from reaching Russia and Moscow.

The BNR Rada draws attention to the fact that Belarus has not received any compensation related to the Chernobyl catastrophe, neither from the central Soviet government at the time, nor from the Russian Federation as the USSR’s legal successor.

The BNR Rada notes that since the 1990s the regime of Alexander Lukashenka has been implementing a policy of re-cultivation of the Chernobyl-contaminated areas, as well as has repressed those scientists who warned against the risks of this policy. Contaminated areas have been in use for agricultural production. Benefits have been taken away from persons who were involved in fighting the Chernobyl power plant accident. Moreover, the regime of Alexander Lukashenka is constructing a nuclear power plant in Astraviec, close to the border with the Lithuanian Republic, without having had any proper public discussion of this project, while lacking a democratic mandate from the people of Belarus, and using Russian contractors and Soviet-developed technologies.

The BNR Rada calls for responsible policies in the energy sector, in agriculture and in area development, in order to avoid a new Chernobyl-type accident, and to be overcoming the aftermath of the 1986 catastrophe in an effective manner.

The BNR Rada demands a freeze of the construction of the nuclear power plant in Astraviec until this issue has been a matter of a full-scale, open and fair debate in the society of Belarus.

19 March 2016

Statement in PDF

Introduction

The purpose of this presentation is to refer to the particular experience of Belarus with regard to Communist crimes without statutory limitations, in order to set forth the arguments that underpin the Rada’s position on international measures to secure legal redress for such crimes, as well as its support for creating an appropriate judicial body in the EU.

After a brief historical background overview, I will firstly point out that it follows from the particular experience of Belarus that unblocking the way to legal settlement for Communist crimes without statutory limitations will require, as a prerequisite, securing redress also in relation to crimes committed although after the formal demise of Communism – but deriving directly from the Communist system and ideology. I will also mention how that affects the current EU member states. Secondly, the experience of Belarus does highlight the need for creating a robust international legal framework to attain justice with regard to Communist crimes, as well as Communist-derived crimes. Finally, I will announce a proposal from the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile for creating a norm of international law that would be instrumental for enabling international legal settlement for Communist crimes without statutory limitations.

Historical Background – Communist Crimes in Belarus

Waging a “revolutionary” war for Communist takeover in order to establish a world-wide Communist system was a core tenet and policy of Bolshevism when it took hold of Russia. Hence for such a government, the territory and resources of the country it controlled were only means for waging a war of aggression on its neighbours. In that sense, the Soviet Communist state a-priori resembled internationally a criminal enterprise rather than a proper state, and Belarus became one of its earliest victims.

A democratic Belarusian state was declared fully independent on the 25 March 1918 as the Belarusian Democratic Republic. Recognised by several other states but lacking support from the great powers of the age, in early 1919 it was overrun by Soviet Russia’s Red Army, its state institutions went into exile. Belarus was declared a Soviet republic, with the Red Terror fully unleashed. In 1921 it was then partitioned between Soviet Russia and Poland by the Treaty of Riga. A puppet Belarusian Soviet Socialist republic was re-established east of that border, incorporated into the USSR, and subjected to the full scale of early Soviet Bolshevik and later Stalinist terror. From 1929 on, the Communist “social cleansing” in Belarus was complemented by systematic persecution and destruction of its national educated class[1].

Special NKVD operations were also ordered from Moscow in Belarus in 1936-1937 targeting the Latvian, German and Polish ethnic minorities. After September 1939, the same fate was unleashed onto the Western areas of Belarus[2]. The repressions continued on a lesser scale after the Second World War. The overall number of peacetime victims[3], for which documentary references could be traced, is currently estimated around 700,000, i.e. about 10% of the population. A mass grave site near Minsk, Kurapaty, partially excavated in 1988, was estimated to have contained over 150,000 victims. Persecutions of dissidents, as well as policies of wiping out the country’s particular national identity (“denationalisation”[4]), continued in Belarus in various forms until late Perestroyka, as the Communist party there remained notoriously hard-line.

Lack of Justice for Communist Crimes at the National Level

Apart from a particular severity and length, the Communist crimes described above were largely a common experience of countries under Soviet domination. But unlike most others, neither a full vindication for the victims, nor bringing the perpetrators to justice, has become possible in Belarus at the national legal level so far.

In 1990-91 the Belarusian Popular Front’s pro-democracy minority in the last Soviet-era parliamentary assembly of Belarus achieved the adoption of several legal provisions, granting the cleared of charges (rehabilitation) status to the victims of “unfounded political repressions” for “counter-revolutionary crimes” since 1920, as well as political crimes up to 1988. However, this did not extend to those proven to have actually opposed or resisted the Soviet authorities, or found guilty of “treason” to the Soviet state. Those cleared of charges were estimated to amount to 60-65% of the victims. Following the restoration of Belarus’s independence, in 1992-93 they were offered small-scale state benefits such as discounts for medicines. In 1994 Belarus co-operated with Lithuania in the extradition of ex-Communist officials Burokevičius and Jermalavičius, later sentenced for involvement in the killing of 14 civilians in the Lithuanian capital in January 1991. But crucially, no legal acts were implemented in Belarus condemning Communism, establishing the past illegality of its rule in Belarus, condemning Communist crimes, or aimed at bringing to justice – or publically identifying – the perpetrators. It became evident in Belarus by mid-1990s that ignoring the past crimes politically, and leaving them without proper legal redress, had not laid any solid foundation for upholding reliable legality for the future. Moreover, that became a major factor paving the way in 1994 for the political revenge of the forces of Soviet continuity in Belarus.

Communist Continuity Crimes as an Obstacle for Justice for Communist Crimes

That early progress was halted and reversed when the regime of Alexander Lukashenka, professing its neo-Soviet ideology, established itself in Belarus between 1994 and 1996 as a dictatorship. As early as in 1995 the victims of Soviet political repressions were stripped of all benefits. The regime of Lukashenka not only restored the Soviet-like state symbols and reintroduced the Russian language as official, and returned the Soviet version of history in the system of education, but went on brutally to suppress its political opponents, effectively resuming political repressions against virtually all the former ideological opponents of Soviet Communism[5]. In some cases the succession has been institutional, as e.g. the KGB in Belarus did not even change its name. The Lenin All-Soviet Communist Youth Union in Belarus was preserved under an amended name, only to be restored under Lukashenka into the official youth organisation and put in charge of the neo-Soviet and pro-Lukashenka political indoctrination of the youth, and recently authorised to form paramilitary units in support of the state police forces.

Hence, all progress to legal settlement for Communist crimes in Belarus was blocked and reversed at the national level, as Lukashenka’s state authorities began to commit a series of new severe violations that have been Communist-derived or pertaining to Communist continuity in their motives and nature. This name appears appropriate here, as those acts of illegality in Belarus have been fundamentally motivated by the objectives of preserving and/or restoring elements of the Soviet Communist system, as well as protecting the political power – or social or economic assets – gained by particular individuals and groups as a direct result of (proceeds of) the earlier Communist rule and its crimes. Since 1995 in Belarus such crimes of Communist continuity by Alexander Lukashenka’s regime have been recorded to include imprisonments, arbitrary arrests, grievous bodily harm, forced hard labour, forced “disappearances” of several prominent political figures, confiscation of property, rigging of elections and usurpation and abuse of state authority, degrading treatment. Recently there have also been presented testimonies of widespread torture suffered by political prisoners[6].

Furthermore, the regime of Lukashenka in Belarus has been obstructing the course of justice internationally in relation to EU member states, by creating a safe haven for individuals from other parts of the former Soviet Union, sought by other countries in connection with Communist crimes, from the Stalinist era to 1991. Lukashenka’s officials refused to release documents on Polish PoW officers allegedly executed in Belarus in 1940 in parallel with the Katyn massacre (“the Belarusian List”) to Poland’s Katyn investigation. Lukashenka’s authorities refused to co-operate with Lithuanian investigators regarding the allegations against Rev. Juozas Bulka (died 2010) relating to a number of assassinations of members of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet underground in the early 1950s. Lukashenka’s regime also refused all extradition requests from the General Prosecutor’s Office of Lithuania for Uładzimir Uschopčyk (Vladimir Uskhopchik) and Stanislava Juonienė, on charges relating to the Soviet army killing of civilians in January 1991.

International Judicial Infrastructure to Include Communist-Continuity Crimes

Therefore, today the regime in Belarus stands as an international and domestic obstacle to attaining justice for Communist crimes, as well as a major current perpetrator of severe Communist-derived violations within the country. The existing international legal framework has been clearly inadequate for the arising problem. Recently there have been attempts to use the private prosecution tool against top members of Lukashenka’s regime travelling outside Belarus, but the national legal framework for that appears insufficient in many EU states[7].

Moreover, the unlawful nature of the regime’s current actions has not been adequately recognised or investigated in the EU framework. As a result, there have been insufficient legal safeguards against the proliferation of the regime’s repressive activities internationally. That has enabled Lukashenka’s authorities maliciously to exploit Belarus’s mutual legal assistance agreements to obtain sensitive information from Poland and Lithuania in order to imprison Aleś Bialacki, Belarus’s leading organiser of human rights activism, an former anti-Communist dissident since 1982. Mr Bialacki is in a prison camp now, and it is feasible to envisage that future legal settlement claims may arise from cases like that of Mr Bialacki, where persons or entities from within EU member states had provided – by intent or negligence – information enabling the regime in Belarus to carry out political repressions potentially leading to crimes against humanity (torture).

Conclusions and Proposals

Based on the particular experience in Belarus, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile points out, firstly, that the establishment of an EU-backed judicial body for the crimes of Communism without statutory limitations – thereby “internationalising” justice for Communist crimes – would make attaining justice by far more likely even in cases when that would all too likely fail at the national level, and/or when inter-state bilateral legal assistance procedures prove fruitless[8]. It would make it more difficult for those implicated to escape justice exploiting local legal circumstances or barriers between national judicial systems. Secondly, the experience of Belarus further highlights the need for extending the international framework for legal settlement also to include the Communist-derived type of crimes. Their perpetrators pursue the objectives of securing Communist continuity domestically and internationally, in order to continue to benefit from the proceeds of – and to obstruct the course of justice in relation to – the original Communist crimes.

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile will call upon any future democratic authority in Belarus to support the creation of an international judicial body for the crimes of Communism, and Communist-derived crimes, without statutory limitations.

We further suggest that, upon the establishment of that judicial body (whether EU-backed or not), the recognition of its jurisdiction should be made a binding condition for any state wishing to enter into an association agreement, to join the EU, or to enter into, upgrade or extend, other types of agreements with the EU.

Finally, the Rada of Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile proposes that a norm of international law should be created binding states not to withhold evidence pertaining to crimes against humanity.

Mikałaj Pačkajeŭ

Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile

5 June, 2012

European Parliament, Brussels

Endnotes

[1] As an example of Belarusian intelligentsia being exterminated with particular severity, while the Belarusian Union of Writers and other Belarusian PEN-type associations in 1930 counted about 700 members in Soviet Belarus, only 7 members were known to remain alive and free in 1939. Also, by 1939 not a single place of worship of any religion remained open anywhere in the Soviet-controlled Belarus.

[2] Prior to that in Poland as a result of the 1921 Riga Peace Treaty.

[3] This excludes the victims of e.g. Communist summary executions and other war crimes in Belarus, against PoWs and the population at large, during the Red Army’s offensive against the Belarusian Democratic Republic (winter 1919), Soviet-Polish war (1919-1920), the Red Army’s offensive against the Belarusian Democratic Republic’s authorities in Słucak District (November-December 1920), and the Second World War, as well as during Soviet anti-partisan operations in the 1920s and 1944-1950s.

[4] This term was coined for Belarus in English by David Marples in: Belarus: a Denationalised Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999.

[5] While these new repressions did not affect most churches, still e.g. the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox (in exile since 1944) remain suppressed in Belarus.

[6] A legal firm in London has been representing the victims and their relatives in that respect, as of May 2012.

[7] In January 2012 a case was filed in a court in Paris on behalf of a group of Belarusian prisoners’ relatives against the Interior Minister of Belarus, Anatoli Kulašoŭ (Anatoly Kuleshov) for “torture and cruel and degrading treatment”, but this did not result in measures to bring him before an inquiry:

http://www.rferl.org/content/french_torture_charge_against_belarus_minister/24457304.html

[8] Apart from the failed extraditions from Belarus, in July 2011 Lithuania was refused by Austria to extradite ex-KGB Colonel Mikhail Golovatov, a visiting Russian citizen, wanted for alleged involvement in the Soviet army killing of 14 civilians in the Lithuanian capital in January 1991.

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile

– Considering  the Russian government’s decision to set up a military airbase in Belarus,

– Referring to the Concluding Memorandum of the Consultative Meeting of the leaders of Belarusian political and civic organisations and the President of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile “On Measures to Safeguard the Independence of Belarus” of 3 November 2012 (“the Vilnius Memorandum”):

States that by allowing the creation of the said base at this time the official authorities of the Republic of Belarus would contribute to strengthening the offensive capability of Putin’s Russia, thereby setting Belarus in opposition to the other states of the region, as well  as to the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. The BNR Rada highlights the fact that the creation of a Russian military base in Belarus would represent an obstacle to overcoming Belarus’s international isolation;

The Rada BNR points out that the circumstances of Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea testify to the Kremlin’s readiness to use its military bases abroad against the very countries which would allow the said bases to be set up within their territory. In this respect the BNR Rada notes that setting up a Russian military base in Belarus would lead to a substantial increase of risks for Belarus’s independence, creating crucial leverage for Putin’s regime to influence the future of Belarus;

The Rada BNR also highlights the fact that Aliaksandar Lukashenka – having lost his legitimacy as the president of Belarus since 1996 – lacks a legal right to make decisions on behalf of Belarus.  Neither is this authority held by the so-called “National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus”, since that body has itself been set up against the law, and formed in contradiction to democratic procedures;

The Rada BNR further points to the fact that establishing a foreign military base in Belarus directly contradicts the Constitution of Belarus which sets the objective of neutrality for our country;

The Rada BNR states that the foreign policy pursued by the incumbent official authorities of the Republic of Belarus – which remains based on trading Belarus’s sovereignty for economic and political sponsorship from the Kremlin – is showing itself once again to be a danger to Belarusian statehood, as well as in direct contradiction to the interests of the Belarusian nation, and by extension to the interests of international security;

The Rada BNR appeals to all the signatories of the Vilnius Memorandum, as well to all other Belarusian politicians sharing our goals of democracy and independence for Belarus, to make every effort to oppose the creation of a foreign military base in Belarus. The BNR Rada appeals to all friendly foreign governments  to apply diplomatic pressure on the incumbent official authorities of the Republic of Belarus so as to prevent the creation of an air force base in Belarus for Putin’s Russia, which would pose ongoing real and immediate danger for peace and security in Europe.

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On May 5th at the World Hockey Championship in Sweden, uniformed personnel used violence against members of the organization “ Bielaruskaja Nacyjanalnaja Pamiac” (Belarusian National Memory) who had spread the white-red-white flag in the crowd. The personnel justified their action because of the “political character of the flag”.

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile states that the white-red-white flag is not the symbol of any political party – it is the State Symbol of the Republic of Belarus.

The Rada points out that the Lukashenka regime changed the State symbols of Belarus after the so-called “referendum” of 1995. This “referendum” was the beginning of the regime’s aggression against existent legislation, democracy, and human rights in Belarus. It was held with grave violations of the Constitution and the laws of Belarus. At the time of its planning, on the premises of the Parliament, the KGB violently repressed 19 Opposition members. During the referendum, violations were observed at every location where observers were present. This gave grounds to consider the results of the so-called “referendum” as illegitimate. In addition, the results were not confirmed by the sitting Parliament.

The white-red white flag is a historical symbol of Belarus. The behaviour of the aggressors at the World Championship is an insult to national honour and the dignity.

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic requests that Sweden investigate the actions of the uniformed personnel and take appropriate measures according to the law. The Rada equally requests that the International Hockey Federation respect State symbols and human rights during championships.

The Rada also protests against the declarations of the chair of the Belarusian Hockey Federation Mr. Jauhien Vorsin and his dubious words directed against “dark skin” fans. These words are not only unacceptable in our civilized world, but contradict the Olympic spirit, based on racial equality and the absence of discrimination, be it racial or national.

6 May 2013

( original signed by  )
Ivonka J. Survilla
President, Rada of the Belarusian
Democratic Republic in Exile

ON MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELARUS

We, the undersigned representatives of political and civic organisations of Belarus, meeting on 3rd November 2012 in Vilnius under the aegis of the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (hereinafter “BNR Rada”) in Exile and acting in accord and full co-operation with the President and Governing Council of the BNR Rada in Exile:

• recognising the risks arising from the gradual loss by the state structures of the Republic of Belarus – as they are turned into instruments for the exercise of personal power by Alexander Lukashenka – of the hallmarks of the Belarusian national statehood and their functionality as the Belarusian national sovereignty guarantor;
• convinced that the Belarusian people itself, as the sole bearer and the principal guarantor of the sovereignty of Belarus as well as of the Belarusian people’s national-cultural future, must be able freely to express its political will;
• and with a view to preserving and fully restoring the sovereignty to the Belarusian people in our national homeland as an objective that shall unite the political community in Belarus as well as Belarusians all over the world,

have agreed and hereby undertake to work together to achieve the following objectives:

1. To restore to the people of Belarus a mechanism to enable them to make free and informed decisions about their political future, which will serve as a guarantee of Belarusian national sovereignty. To attain this end, the authoritarian regime will have to be dismantled. Measures shall be implemented at the earliest opportunity to prevent a repeat of authoritarian rule and abuse of power.
2. To gain the broadest possible recognition by the international community that neither Alexander Lukashenka nor the state authorities under his control possess democratic legitimacy, and cannot therefore constitute legally competent representatives to act on behalf of Belarus, in particular in matters pertaining to their entering into obligations under treaties and agreements that may limit or encumber the sovereignty of the state, or relating to the sale of state property. Such treaties, agreements and sales shall not be binding on a future democratic Belarusian state, and shall be subject to review and possible revision or annulment.
3. To co-ordinate the efforts of civic and political organisations, both within Belarus and among Belarusians living abroad. This co-ordination has a vital role to play, both in countering official propaganda that aims to destroy Belarusian national awareness, and in increasing the understanding within Belarusian society of the importance of the existence of a sovereign national Belarusian state.
4. To strengthen co-ordinated pressure from the political community and civil society in Belarus and from outside in order to achieve a reduction of fear within the society of Belarus: first and foremost to secure the release and rehabilitation of political prisoners, an end to political repressions, dismantling of the machinery of repression, freedom for the mass media, and finally the holding of free elections. Fulfilment of these conditions will enable Belarus to emerge from a state of international self-isolation; it will open up opportunities for the growth of prosperity and the reinforcement of the sovereignty of Belarus through proper engagement in the system of international relations.
5. To seek guarantees from the countries of the European Union, the United States of America, and the Russian Federation for the inviolability of Belarusian national sovereignty, for non-recognition of the international legal force of any decisions endangering the sovereign status of Belarus, which have already been made or could be made in the future on its behalf by the authoritarian state authorities, as well as for the denial of legitimacy with respect to any rights and privileges detrimental to Belarus’s sovereignty which may be claimed or demanded from Belarus by the Russian Federation on the basis of the “zone of special interests” doctrine.
6. To draw up an agreed upon joint package of top-priority political, economic and legal measures designed to safeguard Belarusian sovereignty from the risks that may arise during the period of crisis and transition following the collapse of the authoritarian regime. These measures shall include the areas of energy and food supply, cultural and information policy, administrative governability during the period of transition to democracy, and the fight against corruption and organised crime. The parties to this agreement shall to strive to gain the maximum possible international support for securing those objectives.
7. The undersigned representatives from civil and political organisations in Belarus hereby confirm their recognition of the role of the BNR Rada as per its Statute, as a non-partisan institution of Belarusian historical statehood that is above politics. They shall seek to co-ordinate their endeavours for achieving the common objectives listed above with the BNR Rada, and will be able to count on its assistance and support whenever necessary. They will assist the BNR Rada in activities aimed at the fulfilment of its historical mandate.
8. The undersigned representatives from civil and political organisations in Belarus further recognise the BNR Rada as the reserve political repository for the tradition of Belarusian independent statehood, until such time as conditions permit the BNR Rada to relinquish its historical mandate as specified in its Statute, i.e. the election of a democratic state authority in free elections, with a guarantee of state independence. The President and members of the BNR Rada’s Governing Council hereby affirm the commitment of the Rada to the fulfilment of its statutory mandate. Until its mandate is fulfilled, the BNR Rada may also perform other functions, to which it may be properly called by the Belarusian political community and society.

The Belarusian political and civic organisations here represented and the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile intend to work towards ensuring the co-ordination of the political and information activities of all Belarusian communities throughout the world, as well as to encourage appropriate linking of the resources of their organisations and institutions at all levels, within Belarus as well as with foreign contacts, for the implementation of such joint and/or co-ordinated measures aimed at safeguarding national independence in the conditions of the authoritarian regime’s self-isolation, crisis and eventual dismantlement in Belarus.

[Signatories from the organisations, in the alphabetic order, as of the time of signing in Vilnius on the 3rd November 2012:]

Uladzimier Baradač, “Council for National Revival” Organising Committee

Alexander Dabravolski, “United Civic Party”

Mikalaj Dziemidzienka, “Young Front”

Alaksej Janukevich, “BPF Party”

Volha Karač, Civic Campaign “Our Home”

Uladzimier Kolas, “Council (Rada) of Belarusian Intelligentsia”

Alaksandr Milinkievič, The “Movement for Freedom”

Stanislaw Shushkevich, “Belarusian Social-Democratic Hramada Party”

Vincuk Viačorka, “Belarusan Ruch”

[Signatories from the organisations, in the alphabetic order, joined as of the time of publication on the 12th November 2012:]

Uladzimier Niaklajeŭ, “Tell the Truth” Campaign

Zianon Paźniak, “BPF Conservative-Christian Party”

Vitaĺ Rymašeŭski, “Belarusian Christian Democracy Party” Organising Committee

Viachaslau Siuchyk, Solidarity Movement “Together”

For the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile:

Ivonka Survilla,
President of the BNR Rada in Exile.

by the Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in Exile

28th December 2010

The Rada of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (the BNR Rada) expresses its concern regarding the brutal repressions against opposition activists, political and human rights organisations, as well as journalists of the independent mass media, which have been unfolding in Belarus in the wake of the so-called presidential “elections” of 19 December, and which are currently gaining in scale. These repressions have involved not only the activists themselves but also their family members.

The BNR Rada calls upon the governments of the European Union member states, the United States of America, Canada, Ukraine, Turkey and Egypt to ban all the KGB and other Belarusian security services personnel, the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, the officials of courts and the state prosecution service of the Republic of Belarus, as well as all of the said individuals’ close relatives, from entering those countries. The BNR Rada regards the said organisations as constituting the machine of repressions used against the democratic opposition activists.

The BNR Rada suggests that this ban should remain in force until such time as the last of the political prisoners in Belarus is released and all the criminal and administrative prosecution cases against the persons persecuted for their political views are cancelled.

( original signed by  )
Ivonka J. Survilla
President, Rada of the Belarusian
Democratic Republic in Exile